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
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**ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY MOBILIZATIONS,
DEMOBILIZATIONS, AND PEACETIME FORCE
MAINTENANCE FROM 1890 TO 1991**

THESIS

**Gottfried Kloimwieder, Captain, USAF
Noel P. Owen, Captain, USA**

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**ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY MOBILIZATIONS,
DEMOBILIZATIONS, AND PEACETIME FORCE
MAINTENANCE FROM 1890 TO 1991**

THESIS

**Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and
Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management**

**Gottfried Kloimwieder, B.S.
Captain, USAF**

**Noel P. Owen, B.S.
Captain, USA**

September 1992

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Preface

As the U.S. enters another period of reduced military budgets, new policies and procedures are considered to maintain effectiveness of military forces. Over the years the U.S. has reduced military forces several times, and subsequently increased forces when war loomed. Knowledge of problems and solutions of the past may be helpful to today's decision makers.

This study identifies trends in military manpower management related to mobilization, demobilization, and peacetime maintenance of U.S. armed forces from 1890 to 1991. Six major military conflicts are studied in the course of this review: The Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War.

Several trends are identified. Recommendations to military manpower planners are made based on the influence these trends have on military effectiveness.

Writing this thesis would have been impossible without the assistance of many. Our thesis advisors, Dr. John A. Muller and Major Rodney P. Rice were of invaluable help in guiding us to a workable topic and then leading us along the way; we thank them for that. We are also indebted to the staff of the AFIT Library, in particular Ms. Pam McCarthy, and to other historical experts from regional and national libraries. Finally, we wish to thank our spouses Pamela and

Jill, as well as our children Elaine and Noelle, and Annie,
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Noel P. Owen
Gottfried Kloimwieder

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Abstract

Military manpower management principles and policies are in constant flux as the military forces mobilize and demobilize during periods of war and peace. This study identifies trends in U.S. military manpower policies and procedures from 1890 to 1991. Major military conflicts reviewed are the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. In all wars until Vietnam, post war active duty forces were larger than prewar forces. However, these active duty forces tended to be relatively small until the Cold War period. This tendency is driven by a combination of budget constraints and a U.S. aversion to maintaining large standing military forces. Before each major military conflict since 1890, active forces were maintained at minimum levels, thereby making mobilizations difficult and time consuming. After most of these wars, demobilizations were rapid, caused turmoil in the remaining force structures and reduced military effectiveness. Generally, the United States prefers to rely on volunteerism as its primary manpower procurement tool, however, conscription was implemented when volunteerism was insufficient to meet national needs.

ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY MOBILIZATIONS,
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I. Introduction

General Issue

All nations are concerned with national security and with few exceptions, establish armed forces to deter or defend against war.

A major consideration in establishing these forces is the recruiting, training, and maintaining of personnel. Since forces cannot be constituted instantaneously, peacetime forces are maintained. The strength of these forces depends on the perceived threat, other national priorities, and the willingness of the nation to support the maintenance of these forces.

This country traditionally has maintained a very small peacetime force and relied heavily on its ability to recruit, train, and arm a sizable force in times of war. While this reliance on large scale mobilization has been successful, the current Secretary of the Army (Michael Stone), maintains that the U.S. has had to pay a heavy price in lives and resources for this practice of maintaining minimal peacetime forces (Stone and Sullivan, 1992:7).

Similarly, after the conclusion of an armed conflict, national interest usually turned away from the armed forces, with frequent demands for rapid demobilization. This practice has made it difficult for military leaders to transition to a peacetime force capable of effective deterrence and the resolution of minor armed conflicts.

Specific Issue

The purpose of this thesis is to identify general trends in the management of military forces since 1898 with particular emphasis on mobilization, demobilization, and peacetime maintenance of these forces.

Definition of Terms

Demobilization. "The discharging of personnel from service and the mothballing of equipment" (Alger, 1981:259). Demobilization can be quantified as a twenty-five percent or greater reduction in total military force in one year (extrapolated from Census Bureau statistics on past wars).

Field Duty. "Describes the activities of units conducting or simulating operations essential to the conduct of war" (Alger, 1981:16).

Garrison Duty. Describes the condition of units that are assigned to an area, normally on a permanent basis, for the purpose of maintaining equipment and facilities and for the purpose of conducting small unit and small scale training (Alger, 1981:16).

Mobilization. Preparation for war by assembling and organizing the military resources, and at times the societal and economic resources of a nation as well. (Alger, 1981:16). Mobilization can be separated into four classifications based upon congressional legislation: Presidential callup, which allows the President to bring 200,000 reservists to active duty; Partial mobilization, which authorizes the President to activate one million reservists; Full mobilization, which allows activation of all reservists and retired military; and Total mobilization, which allows additional manpower acquisition as required (Dept. of Army, FORSCOM Reg 500-3, 1992: g-6).

Peacetime Maintenance. The period between a demobilization and a mobilization. This period is characterized by garrison duty and some field duty. Total military force normally changes by less than five percent a year (extrapolated from U.S. Census bureau statistics).

Research Questions

1. What are the common trends in successive mobilizations since 1890?
2. What are the common trends in successive demobilizations during the same period?
3. What are the common trends in successive inter-war periods from 1890 until 1991?
4. What lessons can modern personnel and manpower planners learn from the examined time period?

Research Methods

To answer our research questions we analyze historical data to find breakpoints in history where, for example, peacetime maintenance turns into mobilization, or where demobilization tapers off into peacetime maintenance. Based on these breakpoints we will divide our selected time period (1898-1991) into segments of mobilization, demobilization, and force maintenance. We will then conduct longitudinal descriptive studies on mobilizations, demobilizations, and the inter-war periods to determine common trends, or conversely, dissimilarities among successive mobilizations, successive demobilizations, and successive inter-war periods.

Data will be extracted from secondary sources such as historical texts and periodicals as well as statistical publications from the U.S. Census Bureau).

Scope/Limitations

Our historical analysis of the United States Military begins in 1890, just prior to the Spanish-American War, and continue through the present. The Spanish-American War was chosen as the starting point because it marks the time period when the United States begins to emerge as a world power and have broader international interests.

Thesis Overview

Chapter II provides a brief historical review and acts as a refresher on U.S. Military History since 1890. Chapter III reviews all mobilizations during the examined time period. Particular attention will be given to the political background leading to the mobilizations, government policies effecting mobilization, manpower acquisition and how it's accomplished during mobilizations, and force training once mobilizations began. Chapter IV will trace the same elements for all demobilizations during the time period. The impact of the methods of demobilization on the remaining forces will be examined. In chapter V, the inter-war periods, or more precisely, periods of stable force size, are reviewed. Chapter VI will summarize the trends found in chapters III, IV, and V, and give recommendations and conclusions.

II. U.S. Military From 1898 To 1991

Historical Review

Rather than maintain a large standing army, the United States has repeatedly relied on mobilization to counter threats against its sovereignty and demobilized to a cadre level when the threat passed (Maude, 1990:2). While some of these mobilizations and demobilizations have been studied extensively [mainly World War II], trend analysis needs to be done to extract any generalized principles or checklists for use in future mobilizations, demobilizations, and general force maintenance or sustainment policy decisions. Analysis of the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the periods of peace between these conflicts is conducted in order to find trends in mobilizations, demobilizations, and force maintenance.

The following historical review is not a complete history of the United States military, but an encapsulation of events in order to provide an overview of the last 100 years of significant events in the military. This overview (and Appendix B: A Historical Chronology) is given as background information for the reader. After this overview, analysis of mobilizations, demobilizations, and force maintenance will be conducted in separate chapters.

Spanish-American War. For two reasons, the Spanish-American War is the starting point for analysis of trends in mobilizations, demobilizations and force maintenance:

(1) it is the first war where U.S. troops fought on foreign soil not contiguous to the United States; and (2) the United States emerged from the war more of a global power than ever before. Military historians suggest that the United States isolationist views about world affairs declines after this war:

the American defeat of Spain, which marked the "coming of age of the United States," led to the acquisition of Caribbean bases, of the Philippines, and other Pacific possessions. (Preston and Wise, 1979:263)

In freeing Cuba we would also gather in the Philippines. That was in turn to make us a colonial power. It was also to make us a Far Eastern power, entangled thereby in the rivalries of the European states in China. That, in turn, inevitably involved us, without our quite knowing it, in the European Power Complex. (Millis, 1956: 168)

Significantly, the Spanish-American War of 1898 found the United States Navy and Army at different levels of preparedness. Due to an expanding interest in overseas trade, and the willingness of Congress to appropriate funds, the Navy had just gone through a period of new construction and modernization during the previous decade (Matloff, 1973:322). Moreover, Congress would continue to fund Naval modernization to keep pace with other nations, to keep current in shipbuilding technologies, and to keep unemployment down. As President Cleveland realized in 1894: "In creating an industry to build the new complex armaments [battleships], we had inevitably created new pressures to expand the armaments in order to sustain the industry"

(Millis, 1956:166). As expansion and modernization of the Navy's fleet occurred just prior to the Spanish American War, so too was the training and education of Naval Officers modernized (Matloff, 1973:322). As a result, the Navy was prepared for a war with Spain.

Unlike the Navy, the Army was unprepared. The regular Army of about 26,000 men was located in Indian fighting posts scattered throughout the West. Moreover, because troops were spread at more than 80 of these posts, few junior officers could get experience in handling large bodies of men (Matloff, 1973:323; Risch, 1989:515; Trask, 1981:145-146). Additionally, historian Maurice Matloff notes that at the declaration of war on April 25, 1898:

The Army lacked a mobilization plan, a well-knit higher staff, and experience in carrying on joint operations with the Navy....Still lacking a consistent program of supervision by the regular forces, most Guard units were poorly trained and disciplined (Matloff, 1973:323).

Guard units objected to any move to place them under control of the Regular Army, and the legality of Guard units serving outside the United States came into question. The result was that while some Guard Units and militia personnel volunteered, the vast majority of volunteers were raw recruits, and both the government and the Army were inadequately prepared to equip, maintain, and supply a large wartime Army (Alger, 1901:6-14; Matloff, 1973:323-324; Millis, 1956:170-174; Risch, 1989:519-524; Trask, 1981:155-162; Weigley, 1967:296-302). The United States "had failed

to coordinate its foreign and military policies; it had declared war and then got ready to wage war" (Risch, 1989:519).

The Spanish American War lasted five months from declaration of war to the signing of a peace treaty. However, combat action lasted less than a week. Nonetheless, U.S. troops fought three extra years to gain control of the Philippines from disgruntled Filipino nationalists who wanted independence rather than a transfer of colonial rule from Spain to the United States. To maintain possessions gained in the war, Congress authorized an increase in active duty Army forces from its prewar strength of 26,000 to 100,000 troops.

The problems associated with mobilization in this short war caused a revamping of the military system from 1899 through 1912. The Navy continued to receive allocations for fleet expansion influenced by "popular agitation for a United States Navy 'second to none'" (Preston and Wise, 1979:263). The Navy also created a General Board, which while advisory, was charged with preparing plans for the defense of the nations and its dependencies, with gathering information, and with effecting cooperation with the Army (Weigley, 1973:186).

The Army underwent more extensive revisions in order to protect newly acquired possessions such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines. As mentioned earlier, Congress had

authorized almost a four-fold increase in Army troops, (needed to control the Filipino insurrectionists), and the Army then began to modernize weapons and equipment, adopting newer rifles, bayonets, the .45-caliber pistol, and a 3" artillery piece using smokeless powder (Matloff, 1973:345-346). More important were the reorganizations of the Army pushed through Congress in 1903 by Elihu Root, Secretary of War. First, Congress adopted Root's proposal for a General Staff, a Chief of Staff, and establishment of the Army War College. Secondly, Congress passed the Dick Act which repealed the Militia Act of 1792, and changed the relationship between Regular and Guard units (Matloff, 1973:350-352; Millis, 1956:179). The Militia Act of 1792 required states to enroll all white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 into the State Militias, and required individuals to supply their own arms and ammunition (Matloff, 1973:108; Millet and Maslowski, 1984:90). The Dick Act sought to address the problems associated with the militia or National Guard. With the Dick Act,

the wholly volunteer National Guard was recognized as the "organized militia" and the first line military reserve. It was to be organized, trained and equipped uniformly with the Regular Army; the Federal government assumed responsibility for providing weapons and equipment as well as regular Army officers as instructors. Minimum Standards of weekly drill and annual encampment time were imposed. (Millis, 1956:179-180)

However, the States had not relinquished control of the Guard. The Federal Government could constitutionally call

on the Guard for internal purposes. For operations not on U.S. soil, the government could only ask for units to volunteer (Millis, 1956:179; Matloff, 1973:351). Still, many in Congress felt that with the funding and training supplied to the Guard by the Dick Act that units would volunteer and be ready to fight.

World War I. War broke out in Europe in 1914 and American merchant ships started coming under attack in May of 1915. President Wilson, who stressed neutrality from the European war, began to realize the need for military preparedness. In 1915, "Wilson asked his War and Navy Secretaries to formulate new national security programs" (Weigley, 1967:344). Beginning in 1916, Congress started to prepare for the possibility of entering the European War by passing the Navy Act of 1916 and the National Defense Act. The Naval Act called "for creation of the greatest navy in the world" (Matloff, 1973:365-366), and provided funding to build such a Navy.

The National Defense Act authorized a doubling of the Regular Army, a four-fold increase in the Guard, and Guardsmen were now required to "obey the President and defend the Constitution of the United States" (Weigley, 1973:348). An additional part of this act allowed the President to order defense materials and require compliance from industries, and authorized the Secretary of War to survey the capabilities of all arms and munitions industries

and to create government owned nitrate plants for ammunition production (Weigley, 1973:208; Weigley, 1967:349; Matloff, 1973:367). And in the same year, a Council of National Defense was created "to consider especially the problems of economic mobilization" (Weigley, 1973:208).

Even with this preparation in the event of joining the Great European War, the United States did not have the necessary ammunition and weapons, nor the ships needed to transport troops, equipment, and supplies to Europe. In fact, the United States initially had to procure such items from the Allies. Consequently, by the time industry was fully mobilized and producing for war, Germany had already surrendered (Ferrel, 1985:98-117).

From the initial declaration of war, the Army mobilized from a relatively austere force of 213,557 personnel in April 1917 to a staggering 3,685,458 by November 1918. Of these, the majority, some 67%, had been drafted through use of the Selective Service Act passed in May 1917 (Weigley, 1967:357-358).

From 1918 on, demobilization occurred rapidly since nearly all who served in the war were eligible for discharges once the Armistice went into effect. The demobilization had scarcely begun when the War Department became the target of attacks and criticism from the public and Congress to release the servicemen as quickly as possible. Initially, planners considered several policies

to minimize the economic effects of releasing large numbers of men without jobs. In the end, however, they were forced by the public, the press, and Congress to adopt the plan that involved the least delay rather than the most desirable or logical one (Anastas, 1983:12). Thus, by 1 January 1920, only 130,000 remained in the Army, about 70,000 less than authorized. (Weigley, 1967:396).

After the "Great War", Congress realized that the nature of modern war was changing. In response, Congress enacted the National Defense Act of 1920, which reorganized the U.S. Army with three components, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. Furthermore:

each component was to be so regulated in peace that it could contribute its appropriate share of troops in a war emergency. In effect the act acknowledged the actual practice of the United States throughout its history of maintaining a standing force too small to be expanded to meet the needs of a great war, and therefore necessarily of depending on a new Army of civilian soldiers for mobilizations. In contrast to earlier practice, the training of civilian components now became a major peacetime task of the Regular Army, and principally for this reason the Army was authorized a maximum officer strength of 17,726--more than three times the actual officer strength of the Army before World War I. (Matloff, 1973:407-408)

The Navy remained relatively constant in size after World War I --at 96,000 sailors-- due to the 1921 Washington Disarmament Conference, in which the world's naval powers (U.S., Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) agreed to a tonnage ratios limit for each nation (Perret, 1989:341-42).

While the authorized amount of enlisted troops was raised to 300,000 Regular Army, neither the officers or enlisted numbers ever approached full authorizations. Congress started to reduce the numbers and cut back funding of the military (except for Naval and Air Corps projects) because public opinion shifted towards isolationism and pacifism. Moreover:

from 1921 to 1936, the American people, their representatives in Congress, and their Presidents thought the United States could and should avoid future wars with other major powers, except possibly Japan. They believed the nation could achieve this goal by maintaining a minimum of defensive military strength, avoiding entangling commitments with Old World Nations, and yet using American good offices [State Department and other offices] to promote international peace and the limitations of armaments. (Matloff, 1973:414)

Additionally, little modernization of equipment fielded to the forces occurred during this time. Budget constraints caused officers and enlisted to be reduced in grade, often occupy inadequate housing, and train using minimal supplies. Such a structure not only made realistic training more difficult, but also foreclosed any possibility of maintaining even a very small combat ready force (Millet and Murray, 1986:138-139). Despite these limitations, all military services had somehow seen the need to keep active research and development programs alive in light of new inventions in technology, and "were able in general to keep abreast of these developments [in areas of military technology] and produce weapons and equipment that were

qualitatively --if not quantitatively-- equal to the most advanced systems being developed by the great powers" (Millet and Murray, 1986:142-143). However, most of this weapon and equipment innovation was done internally by the services. Industry had demobilized its industrial war base along with the demobilization of the services, and therefore "systematic collaborations between industry, science, and the military remained rare until the outbreak of the Second World War" (Millet and Murray, 1986:144).

World War II. As Russel Weigley has observed, the road to mobilization for the Second World War starts in 1938 with President Roosevelt's 28 January speech to Congress, "for on that occasion he took note of the activities of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and said, 'Our national defense is inadequate for purposes of national security and requires increase'" (1967: 417). Increases in appropriations for the military budgets were gradually enlarged until the German conquest of Denmark and Norway in April 1940. With the fall of France likely, Congress in May of 1940 realized that the dangers of war were real and appropriated billions of dollars for industrial mobilization for military production and procurement, and authorized increases of the Regular Army to 375,000 (Weigley, 1967:421-426; Matloff, 1973:418-420). In September, Congress passed the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940. This allowed for the first peacetime draft of personnel in U.S. history and also gave

the government power to place mandatory orders for equipment and supplies, and to commandeer industrial plants if needed (Smith, 1991:222; Matloff, 1973:419).

While gains were made in the growth and re-equipping of the services from 1940 until declaration of war on December 7, 1941, equipment for training was still relatively short throughout 1941, primarily due to lack of industrial mobilization and the diversion of American arms production to support the Allies (Weigley, 1967:431-434). While there were starts and stops in the overall mobilization effort during 1940-41, "the mobilization experiences of 1917-18 had not been forgotten, and enough study and planning based upon them had persisted through the twenties and thirties to permit the Army of the 1940's to reproduce many of its earlier successes and avoid many of its earlier mistakes" (Weigley, 1967:450). Most of the planning that was done during the twenties and thirties by the Army and Navy Munitions Board resulted in an Industrial Mobilization Plan, published in 1931 and revised through 1939 (Fesler, 1947:3). The Plan was actually comprised of three separate plans: a Protective Mobilization Plan, a Procurement Plan, and an Industrial Mobilization Plan, all of which were made to speedily transition the United States from peace to war (Fesler, 1947:3). Planning done during the inter-war period, such as the Industrial Mobilization Plan, led to an organized successful mobilization for World War II.

However, plans for demobilization at the War's end, while organized, were not nearly as successful with the American public, for as Anastas notes in his thesis on demobilizations:

On 2 September 1945 the Imperial Japanese Government signed the instrument of surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri, thus officially ending World War II. Even before the ink was dry, however, pressure began to build from unhappy soldiers, their loved ones and their congressman to bring the boys home quickly. (Anastas, 1983:17)

The Army, which had the bulk of releasable troops, had to speed up its timetable of demobilization to satisfy Congress and the public. The result was that over five million men, stationed throughout the world, were returned home and discharged between September 1945 and January 1946 (Anastas, 1983:20-28; Matloff, 1973:530).

As demobilization progressed, military and civilian officials were arguing over how to reorganize the national security system to meet current world conditions. World War II proved the need for some form of unified control at the national level and at major military command levels (Matloff, 1973:531). Perret notes that "the unification idea became popular when interservice rivalries left the army and navy fighting what amounted to separate wars in the Pacific" (1989:444). Truman was a proponent of a single uniform service, but the senior army and navy leaders, and their backers in Congress, had different proposals. In the end, the national security system created by the National

Security Act of 1947 was not unified as a single system, but more like a federation. The Act created a National Military Establishment and a National Security Council.

The Military Establishment included the executive Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Office of Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was a cabinet member empowered to exercise general supervision over the Military Services. The Service Secretaries, though not of cabinet rank, had direct access to the president (Millet and Maslowski; 1984:480; Matloff, 1973:531-32). Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became formalized within the military establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was composed of the military chiefs of the three services (the chairman to the Joint Chiefs was added in 1949) and "functioned as the principal advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense" (Matloff; 1973:532).

The National Security Council included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and any other government agency head the President felt he needed to appoint to the council.

According to Maurice Matloff, the Council mission:

was to develop coordinated diplomatic, military, and industrial policies; recommend integrated national security policies to the President; and guide the execution of those policies approved. (Matloff; 1973:532)

Two other events of note also took place in 1947: (1) the repeal of selective service, subsequently reinstated in 1948 when services were unable to maintain required strengths, and (2) the policy of communist containment. Besides the reinstatement of selective service in 1948, integration of women and races into the services was ordered to help offset manpower shortages. In 1949, the National Military Establishment was redesigned as the Department of Defense. The services were thus made military departments within the Department of Defense. This realignment gave the Secretary of Defense true authority over the services.

Korean War. As the postwar and Cold War era unfolded there was a tendency to consider U.S. nuclear monopoly as the primary deterrent to direct Soviet action. As a result, the possibility of conflicts in which the bomb would be neither politically or militarily relevant was almost completely disregarded (Matloff, 1973:540).

Hence, at the start of the Korean War, mobilization plans were based on potential wars analogous to World War II. Because plans for limited war and partial mobilization did not exist, the Korean mobilization required a good deal of improvisation. Unfortunately, such improvised procedures were inadequate in supplying equipment and facilities to support both the requirements of war operations and production of combat ready units (Heymont and McGregor, 1972: Chap 3-2,13).

At the start of the Korean war, U.S. active duty personnel numbered approximately 1.5 million personnel, a number that increased to 3.5 million by the end of the war. The Korean War did not have a demobilization of active duty forces, only reserve and guard personnel were released (Heymont and McGregor, 1972: Chap 3-10,4-1). The reason was the continuance of the policy of Communist containment known as the Truman Doctrine (Matloff, 1973:572). Additionally,

unlike previous postwar periods, no drastic dismantling of the defense industrial base took place. The ever-present Russian threat made rearmament a continuous process dependent upon a mobilization base that could be rapidly expanded if the deterrent failed. (Matloff, 1973:573)

From the end of the Korean War to 1960, national security emphasis was placed on the war-fighting potential of nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces, and active duty strength gradually declined by one million personnel during this seven year period from 1953 to 1960. Eisenhower called this national security policy the "New Look". The intention of the "New Look" was to give "Security with Solvency" by eliminating U.S involvement in proxy wars like Korea (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:511-12). The United States "would rely upon the threat of nuclear escalation to deter or stop Communist-inspired local wars" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:512), an idea clearly echoed in the words of then Vice President Richard Nixon:

Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our mobile retaliatory

power which we could use at our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose. (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:512)

In 1960, a change of political parties in the White House brought changes in national security policies. Kennedy abandoned the concept of the "New Look" for "Flexible Response". "Flexible Response" gave the President more options than nuclear escalation and stressed the need for ready conventional forces as a deterrent to limited war (Matloff, 1973:591; Perret, 1989:485). The Cuban Missile Crisis and Berlin Crisis, both occurring in 1962, and the subsequent U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, are examples of "Flexible Response".

Vietnam. While the United States had advisors in Vietnam in 1956 to help in the process of transferring American weapons owned by the French to the South Vietnamese, the number of U.S. personnel involved was minimal until 1961. Kennedy applied his idea of "Flexible Response" to Vietnam because he felt "the Soviet Union and Communist China must not be allowed to score another victory in a proxy war" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:546). By 1963, the numbers of "advisors" significantly increased from 900 before 1960 to 16,000. In 1964, North Vietnam attacked U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, off North Vietnam, and the U.S. Congress responded with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which allowed the President to take any steps he felt necessary to save Vietnam from communism. Ultimately

Johnson decided to send U.S. combat forces into Vietnam (Matloff, 1973:624-29; Millet and Maslowski, 1984: 548-49).

The United States military industrial base was intact due to the nature of the cold war, and selective service was still being used. Buildup therefore consisted of a gradual expansion of the number of Regular personnel (career and draftees) and also a limited call up of reserve units starting in 1968.

With the lack of public support for the Vietnam War growing and the Nixon Doctrine calling for Vietnam to provide more of its own defense, the United States helped negotiate a settlement in 1972 between the two Vietnams, withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, and ended the use of selective service for the first time since 1948 (Halloran, 1986:16-18).

With the end of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, the U.S. Military demobilized from 3.6 million active duty personnel to 2.1 million. Congress then took steps to ensure that another Vietnam could not occur by issuing the War Powers Resolution in 1973. The Resolution allows the President to send troops into conflict if he deems such action necessary, but the troops cannot stay longer than 60 days without a declaration of war or specific congressional authorization to continue use of troops (McCormick, 1985:192).

1980-1991. The United States continued with the concept of the Nixon Doctrine (with the exception of the Middle East) until Reagan came to power in 1980. Reagan returned to the "Flexible Response" concept and significantly increased military modernization programs. Troop levels, however, remained at post-Vietnam levels of approximately 2.1 million. During Reagan's administration, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was signed into law. This law reformed the National Security Act again and had four principle objectives:

1. Meaningful unification of the U.S. military establishments.
2. A more rational resource allocation process.
3. A more efficient acquisition process.
4. Improved planning and preparation for conflict at the low end of the spectrum of warfare. (Kruzel, 1988:172-74)

When Vice President Bush was elected President, he continued with the "Flexible Response" concept as stated in his National Security Strategy of 1990 (Bush, 1990:87). However, in 1990 Bush also saw the Cold War wind down and stated "As we make fundamental changes in our military forces, we will preserve a capacity for reversibility" (Bush, 1990:92), implying to the world that the United States will not allow its military power to become ineffective. In his 1991 National Security Strategy, Bush also stated that by 1995 the military would be 25% smaller (approximately 1.6 million active duty) due to changes in the World environment (Bush, 1991:124).

Conclusion. In reading the above historical synopsis of the U.S. Military from the Spanish-American War to the present, two general trends appear:

1. Active duty strengths after all wars until Vietnam are larger than pre-war strengths, attributable to ever-expanding national interests outside the United States.
2. Increasingly centralized control over the military services through the National Security Acts.

In the next three chapters trend analysis of mobilizations, demobilizations, and peacetime force maintenance since the Spanish-American War will be conducted.

III. Mobilizations

Political Background and Policy

Introduction. In the last chapter, a brief historical overview of the last 100 years of United States mobilizations, demobilizations, and peacetime maintenance of its standing military force was presented in order to give a chronological background of events for those without a strong knowledge of U.S Military history. In this chapter, U.S. mobilizations since 1890 are analyzed by themselves, in successive order, to derive and present common trends in political background and policies effecting the military, manpower acquisition, and training, as lessons learned for future civilian and military planners.

Maintaining a large standing military force, capable of defeating all potential threats during times of peace, is an extreme economic burden for a country. Few nations can afford to maintain such a force. Instead, nations usually maintain a limited standing force based on perceived needs, and develop plans to rapidly assemble and organize troops, material, and equipment for active military service when needed for war or other national emergencies.

As suggested in Chapter One, mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing the economic, military, and societal resources of a nation for an emergency. Harold Clem, a National Defense University writer on mobilization preparedness, states that mobilizations are an act of

political will, "a decision by the President, supported by Congress, and ultimately by the people, to prepare for war" (Clem, 1983:1). This political will to mobilize is manifest in actions taken towards preparing the military, the nation's industrial base, and the civilian populace for war. Diplomatic measures towards allies and enemies prior to and during hostilities are also part of the political conditions for mobilization. Some or all of the above actions will occur in times of mobilization, depending on how national leaders perceive the threats.

Spanish-American War. The political and policy analysis of mobilizations start with the Spanish-American War because, as noted previously, this war transformed the United States from an isolationist country to a world power. At the time of the Spanish-American War, the concept of the citizen-soldier was still very much in vogue. The Militia act of 1792 was still in effect and required all free white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 to join the militia. The act also required that the citizens provide their own arms and equipment. In time of need, the idea was that the citizen-soldier would come armed to defend his country. Thus, U.S. military defenses reflected the concept of citizen-soldier use.

Two decades earlier, an Army reform movement, led by Sherman and Upton of Civil War fame, tried to increase the strength and posture of the Army and had no success.

Congress saw no reason to increase the size of the army, add a national volunteer reserve, nor change the role of the militia as Upton urged (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:255-258; Perret, 1989:272). At the time, Congress did not see a threat to the United States security; the army was able to handle the Indian Wars, and relations with neighboring countries of Canada, Mexico, and Spain (via Cuba) did not suggest the need to worry about invasion (Perret, 1989:272). However, in potential areas of threat, such as attacks upon coastal areas, Congress provided funds for coastal fortification modernization (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:251-254). And so in the 1890's, as tensions built towards war over Spain's rule of Cuba, the United States relied on two oceans, coastal fortifications, a small Army, a small but expanding Navy, and the citizen-soldier for defense.

Indeed, the Navy's expansion during the 1890's was due to a shift in naval thinking and public support. American wartime naval strategy of the past consisted of commerce raiding and blockade running (Perret, 1989:275; Millet and Maslowski, 1984:260). But the new strategy of the 1890's, written about by naval Captain A.T. Mahan, stated that "a navy's purpose was to gain 'command of the sea' by defeating the enemy fleet in decisive battle" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:260). While historians note that Mahan's extrapolations of British sea power as a guide for the

United States had serious flaws, Mahan's writings, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History and "The United States Looking Outward", both written in 1890, had tremendous impact on the United States and other industrialized nations such as England, France, Germany, and Japan (Perret, 1989:276; Millett and Maslowski, 1984:260).

Mahan's writings had something for everyone: those who wanted a large navy got justification for a large navy; those who valued the concept of free trade supported the shift in naval emphasis from commerce raiding to protection of merchant ships and the destruction of enemy navies.

Mahan's writings were reflected in the popular opinions of the times: the Continental U.S. was conquered; the Indian Wars were over; the United States was the world's leading industrial nation; and many thought that the United States should continue expanding, either in actual possessions such as Hawaii or by conquering world markets and defending internal markets (Matloff, 1973: 319-20; Perret, 1989:277-78). This era has been called the "New Manifest Destiny" and was reflected in Congressional action which passed the Naval Act of 1890 that ultimately allowed for construction of three ocean-going battleships with a 5000 mile range, ships which could command distant sea lanes and put Mahan's theories into practice. Although Congress was not in favor of annexing territorial possessions, it did favor making the U.S. a world market power (Perret, 1989:274,278).

The actual road to war with Spain began in 1895 when Cubans revolted over Spanish taxation and Spanish rule. As the fighting between Cuba and Spain continued, conditions between the United States and Spain deteriorated. For a variety of humanitarian and expansionist reasons, the United States wanted Spain to grant Cuba independence. For expansionists, Cuba's independence represented a way of gaining a foothold in the Caribbean; for humanitarians, Cuban independence represented an end to the Spanish atrocities often reported in U.S. newspapers.

Obviously, sentiment was ripe for war and noteworthy people such as Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, gave military preparedness speeches with the theme: "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war" (Perret, 1989:277-78). The final catalyst for war came in February 1898 with a newspaper printing of a letter stolen from a Spanish minister which contained insulting comments about President McKinley and the unexplained sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:148; Matloff, 1973:321-22; Millett and Maslowski, 1984:268).

In March, just after the sinking of the USS Maine, Congress authorized President McKinley \$50 million dollars to spend on defense for a potential war with Spain. McKinley still hoped to negotiate a settlement with Spain, and avoid a war. Spain agreed to all U.S. demands except

one, the independence of Cuba. Spain would not give up Cuba, a colonial possession for over 400 years, but the United States would not accept continued Spanish rule over Cuba. Negotiations deteriorated to the point that Spain declared War on the U.S. on 23 April and Congress subsequently declared war on 25 April, 1898.

When Congress declared war, only limited planning by the Navy for war with Spain had taken place, even though U.S.-Spanish relations had been deteriorating for three years. Neither service was tasked to do any war planning, but given the Navy's mission to command the seas, Rear Admiral Luce tasked the Naval War College to study the implications of War with Spain. As a result, the Navy had a mobilization plan while the Army did not (Millelt and Maslowski, 1984:270-71; Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:150).

The initial strategic United States military preparations followed the Navy plan that conceptualized the war as primarily a naval operation with limited land activity in which the Army's role was to help the Cuban rebels gain control of Cuba, while the Navy gained control of the seas (Millelt and Maslowski, 270-71). Under this scenario, General Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, proposed that an additional force of 50,000 men should be raised to add to the current forces of approximately 30,000 in the regular army. Miles also suggested that the militia be emplaced at coastal defenses to be used as a manpower

pool. Such a plan was introduced in Congress by Representative John T. Hull, but was quickly defeated. The majority of legislators felt that any manpower legislation should fully utilize the militia. The end result was that on 22 April a bill was passed to create a volunteer army. The bill allowed militia members first chance to volunteer, as whole units or as individuals, before the general public, in an initial callup by the President. The formation of volunteering militia personnel circumvented the legal question of whether the President had authority to send the militia to fight on foreign soil.

General Miles and the Army still planned on the President to call for 50,000 to 60,000 volunteers. McKinley called for 125,000 in the initial callup on 23 April. McKinley summoned such a large number for the following reasons:

The President wanted to avoid Lincoln's mistake of mobilizing too few troops at the outset and hoped that the spectacle of an arming host might break Spain's will to resist. More importantly, the 125,000 figure was close to existing National Guard strength. Calling out fewer would alienate those Guardsmen unable to volunteer, dampening martial enthusiasm and courting political disaster. (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:273)

While this shows a lack of communication between the President, his Secretary of War, and the Army's Commanding General, the Army and its supply system was not prepared for either 50,000 or 125,000 volunteers. In fact, the Army only had enough stocks on hand to equip 10,000 additional

personnel (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:156). The 125,000 volunteer quota was met within six weeks and the volunteers arrival at mobilization camps initially overwhelmed the Army supply system, in part because planners believed assurances from states that guardsmen would come equipped by the states. But most volunteers did not come equipped, at least by Army standards, because the Army and individual states had no mutual definition of what constituted being equipped (Millett and Maslowski, 1984:273).

Manpower mobilization had preceded logistical mobilization, and Army logisticians struggled to catch up. Another manpower callup, raising the army to 250,000 men, was issued 25 May, but by then the army had a logistics system in place. Within two months material mobilization caught up with manpower mobilization.

Lack of communication became a common theme in the conduct of preparations. While Secretary of Navy Long and Secretary of War Algers realized that overseas operations required joint planning, joint cooperation was poor, a situation that required President McKinley to serve as the interservice mediator (Millett and Maslowski, 1984:269). Additionally, McKinley had to put up with planning quarrels between his Secretary of War and his Commanding General. General Miles realized that amphibious operations required detailed planning and troops needed training, both of which took time. Planning for operations to commence after Cuba's

hot rainy season in October would provide the time needed for planning, training, and supply gathering, and would be a healthier time for soldiers to fight. On the other hand, Alger, the Secretary of War, favored quick action.

Events were to favor quick action. By May, the Navy had a blockade around Cuba, and on 1 May, Dewey defeated the Spanish naval squadron in the Philippines. McKinley initially favored a fall invasion of Cuba, but on 2 May decided for invasion by mid-June because public sentiment demanded immediate action against the Spanish. The result was a hastily put together expedition whose embarkation and debarkation were one of the poorest managed phases of the war (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:172).

Observations on the Spanish-American War. The Spanish-American War holds many mobilization lessons for the civilian and military planner. The concept of the citizen-soldier volunteering to defend his country is strongly held by the nation. Therefore, questions concerning the Militia's role in U.S. Security, the Militia's minimum training and equipment requirements, who funds those requirements, and the federal government's power to use Militia units outside the United States needed to be adequately defined at the end of the war.

Planners also learned of the effect of journalism upon public sentiment and military operations. The accounts of Spanish Atrocities by the newspapers stirred up moral

indignation in the U.S. populace. Public moral indignation really left the President no other recourse but war if Spain did not give Cuba independence. And once war broke out, public mood required mobilization and action on a faster timetable than what the army wanted or could adequately handle. Additionally, strategic and tactical military information was reported in American newspapers which were available to the Spanish Government within hours (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:346).

The United States initially struggled to supply and equip the Army for war. But how to be in a better state of preparation for war needed to be addressed. Critical mobilization supplies that were not in general use, such as ammunition and weapons were not adequately stocked to preclude shortages.

Lastly, and most importantly, the Spanish-American War established the need for unity of effort within each service, between services, and between the military and foreign policy makers. The Army and Navy did not work together in shaping one consolidated interservice plan and this required Presidential mediation to coordinate efforts. How to create unity of effort between the services still needed to be established. Moreover, unity between foreign policy and military policy also needed to be established. Foreign policy had been aggressively pursued since 1895 when Cubans rebelled against Spanish rule, yet no one thought nor

were required to do comprehensive mobilization planning for the United States in the event that foreign policy lead to war.

World War I. When war broke out in Europe, August 1914, Britain, France, and Russia opposed Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the United States, while fifteen percent of the population was pro-German and a larger percentage pro-ally, the predominant public opinion was for United States neutrality. General public sentiment, as stated by Gregory was, "The United States had had no part in the start of the war, it should have no part in its conduct" (1971:3,12). In 1914, the major security concern in the United States was not the European War, but the Mexican Revolution taking place on the southern border of the United States. Thus, President Wilson declared the United States neutral in respect to the European War.

To the United States, neutrality meant that except for items defined as contraband in international law, commerce with Europe would continue almost as if war did not exist. If the war had been resolved quickly, this may have been a valid expectation; but as the war progressed, the United States enforcement of neutrality eventually entered the United States into the confrontation. Ideally as a neutral nation, the United States would continue trade with all European countries. However, British control of the seas effectively halted U.S. trade with Germany. While British

interpretation of the international laws of the sea frustrated the United States, the friction was not enough to cause the President Wilson to side with Germany or to place a trade embargo on the warring countries. Germany only accounted for four percent of U.S. trade before the war, while the Allies made up over nineteen percent. As trade with Germany declined, Allied trade dramatically increased four-fold, pulling the United States out of a Depression and bringing prosperity (Abrahamson, 1983:89; Gregory, 1971:43).

Germany's response to Britain's command of the seas and the Allies access to American supplies was the submarine. The United States slow shift from neutrality began in February 1915 when the Germans announced a submarine campaign in the waters around the British isles and warned that while Germany planned to strike enemy ships, neutral vessels might be struck accidentally. Submarines struck without warning, and they not only destroyed cargo, but also the ships, passengers, and crew. On May 7, 1915, the British Oceanliner Lusitania was sunk without warning by a German submarine. The Lusitania carried U.S. passengers and 124 were killed. The people of the United States could accept the loss of confiscated or destroyed cargo, but not the loss of U.S. citizens. This sinking inspired a nationalist movement for retaliation (Gregory, 1971: 29).

President Wilson viewed the Lusitania sinking as intolerable and a crime against humanity, but was not

convinced that the United States should declare war (the Lusitania was not an U.S. ship and international law was vague about neutrals being on belligerent vessels). Wilson still believed a peaceful solution could be arrived at, and so did the American people. One of the reasons Wilson was reelected President in 1916, in fact, was because he had been able to keep the United States out of war (Gregory, 1971:57,60, 103).

President Wilson tried to get the belligerents to negotiate a peace settlement, but realized that the prospects for peace were slim when Germany abruptly announced unrestricted submarine warfare on 29 January 1917. Germany realized that this act would probably force the United States into the war but were willing to take the risk because Germany felt that it would take the United States at least two years to mobilize and effect the ground war, while the Allies supply lines could be destroyed within eight months, thereby forcing the Allies into submission (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:329; Gregory, 1971:120).

The submarine issue caused President Wilson to sever diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 February 1917. Three weeks later, Wilson learned Germany had proposed a military alliance with Mexico and had gone so far as to offer financial assistance and support in reacquiring Mexican territory lost in the war with the U.S. in 1848. Later in March, German submarines also sank three U.S. merchant

ships, prompting President Wilson to ask Congress for a declaration of war in April 1917.

Congress and the Services had taken several steps to correct planning deficiencies observed during the Spanish-American War. Congress approved creation of the Navy General Board in 1900, and the Army General Staff in 1903. Both the General Board and General Staff were given responsibility for war planning (Millet and Maslowski, 1984: 304, 310-11). However, in 1914 Wilson forbade the services to plan for a European war. Wilson felt such planning was a provocative act for a neutral nation to take. So just as in the Spanish-American War, the United States entered into war without any plans for war mobilization.

While the services were not able to plan for potential wars, this did not stop Congress from passing national defense preparedness legislation. In 1916, two significant pieces of preparedness legislation were passed: the Naval Act of 1916, and the National Defense Act of 1916.

The Navy Act authorized construction of enough vessels --10 battleships, 16 cruisers, 50 destroyers, 72 submarines, and 14 auxiliary ships-- to make the United States Navy the second largest and the most modern navy in the world (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:322). As in the Spanish-American War, expanding the Navy was almost universally acceptable to the general populace in the United States. To those who did not see a reason to intervene in the European

war, Navy preparedness "could still be an instrument of unilateral action, foreign trade, and protection of the Western Hemisphere during and after the war" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:322). To those who favored intervention, naval preparedness was "a useful way to mobilize public opinion, coerce the Germans, and hearten the allies" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:322).

Several reform acts to correct manpower deficiencies had been passed since the Spanish-American War: the Dick Act of 1903 which modified the Militia Act of 1792; the Militia Act of 1908 that tried to correct deficiencies of the Dick Act; the Reserve Act of 1912 that authorized a federal reserve force; and the Volunteer Act of 1914 which authorized Federal Volunteer Forces. The National Defense Act was the final reform act prior to U.S. entrance into the European War, and combined much of the ideas of the above acts, proposals drawn from the General Staff, the National Guard Lobby, citizens preparedness groups, and corporate elite concerned about economic mobilization (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:324). The Act provided a general plan for national defense. It increased the Regular Army from 100,000 to 175,000; defined the militia into three classes: the National Guard (army), the Naval Militia, and the Unorganized militia, a group that included all able bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 who were or wanted to be United States citizens and were not in the National Guard or

Naval Militia. The legality issue of National Guardsmen fighting overseas was finally solved by requiring a dual oath (federal and state) upon enlistment.

The act was also the first piece of legislation to recognize the impact of economic mobilization for war and gave the federal government substantial emergency powers over industry and transportation assets to supply the military during time of war (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:192-96; Millett and Maslowski, 1984:322-25).

In June 1916, two weeks after the National Defense Act was passed in Congress, the act was invoked to mobilize the National Guard and send the Guard to join the regular army at the Mexican border. Tensions between the United States and Mexico were mounting over U.S. troops in Mexico on an expedition to capture Pancho Villa. Eventually, Villa's followers were dispersed and tensions decreased enough to allow demobilization of the Guard in the fall of 1916.

This test of the National Defense system showed that the National Guard still had the same weaknesses that plagued the Militia of the Spanish-American War: lack of training, lack of equipment, and lack of manpower. Fifteen percent of national guardsmen who showed up were deemed unfit for service while recruiting failed to produce enough volunteers to fill the Regular Army and National Guard ranks. Additionally, the mobilization had inexcusable shortages of supplies (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:199-200).

Kreidberg and Henry note three conclusions were drawn from the Mexican Border mobilization: mobilization required economic and military factors to be coordinated; the National Guard as constituted was not a credible second line of defense; and the volunteer system could no longer produce the required amount of manpower in sufficient time (1955:200). These conclusions resulted in the following changes in mobilization planning:

economic factors of mobilization were more fully studied, and the principle of compulsory service was substituted for the old volunteer system. (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:200-201)

To raise the manpower necessary to enter the war and help the Allies, the Selective Service Act was passed in Congress one month after declaration of war. The Army was planning for one million men for the war, but had supplies on hand for only 75,000 men. The Army supply bureaus estimated that to get the equipment, supplies and billeting necessary for one million men would take until September 1917 (approximately six months). Estimates were somewhat optimistic and the Army was not ready to handle a million men until October 1917 (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:310-323).

Many U.S. industries were working at near capacity to supply the Allies when the United States declared war. With the U.S. entering the war, demand for goods and services exceeded supply. For example:

American munitions and firearms manufactures were already fully committed to Allied orders. In April 1917, therefore, the United States could not

form a wartime Army and Navy of its own without expanding and regulating its economy. (Millett and Maslowski, 1984:334)

To regulate the economy, several committees and boards were formed within the Services, the Government, and the private sector. The Council of National Defense, as created in the National Defense Act, provided central planning and control over the committees and boards.

Observations on World War I. World War I was the United States first undertaking in modern alliance warfare. How troops would get to Europe, where and when they would fight, and under whose control, had to be negotiated with Britain and France. The United States ultimately became involved in the coalition because of economic interdependence with the Allies. While sentiment in the United States favored neutrality, it did not favor placing an embargo on trade with warring nations, which would dampen U.S. prosperity. Germany could not allow its enemies, France and Britain, to have access to American supplies, while France and Britain effectively cut-off external sources of supply for Germany. The end result was either stop all European trade or join in the war. The United States eventually chose to join the war.

Public sentiment and military preparedness can be greatly effected by Presidential leadership. While public sentiment was initially neutralist, sentiment moved towards intervention after the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915.

Yet President Wilson, who had strong beliefs in neutrality and negotiating a peaceful settlement, was able to maintain neutrality another twenty-three months and also maintain public support. When circumstances finally caused Wilson to ask for declaration of war, public support was still with the President. It appears that Presidential leadership can focus the direction public sentiment takes. With the military, the President has even greater control being the Commander-in-Chief. Wilson used this control to stop pre-war planning by the military. When war was declared, the services had to develop mobilization plans. Again, just as in the Spanish-American War, better unity of effort was needed between foreign and military policy.

In developing mobilization plans, economic mobilization was considered for the first time because many sectors of industry were already at full capacity supporting the Allies' needs when the U.S. entered the war. Government control of industry was needed to insure continued supply of Allied forces while building up and sustaining U.S. forces. Even with government control, initial manpower mobilization outpaced industry's ability to equip the mobilized men, just like in the Spanish-American War.

For the first time in U.S. history, the vast majority of manpower requirements were met by conscription rather than through volunteerism. The Mexican Border Crisis of 1916 had shown the difficulties of obtaining large numbers

of volunteers. To meet the numbers of men needed to participate in the European war, a selective service system was instituted and proved to be much more cost effective than previous recruiting efforts in previous wars (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:253-281).

World War II. With the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany and World War II officially began. September 1939 found the United States in a slightly different posture of readiness than in World War I or the Spanish-American War. As in World War I, public opinion still favored neutrality, and most people believed the Allies would quickly stop Hitler either by diplomacy or force. In addition, the war brought the United States out of a depression just as World War I had done. This time, however, the United States Government did something significantly different because it actively monitored economic activity and revitalized the U.S. Military from the outset of war in Europe.

One reason for the different stance towards the war was because Franklin Roosevelt believed in a proactive government. Roosevelt had created "The New Deal", which, in turn, helped the U.S. grapple with the Great Depression but also created a large federal administration needed to run economic management policies. Administration of "The New Deal" created much of the knowledge and experience necessary to transition to a wartime managed economy (Dreisziger,

1981:81). And while the "New Deal" had not successfully gotten the United States out of the Depression, it had accustomed U.S. citizens to greater government involvement in the nation's social and economic aspects than at any other time in United States history.

After the fall of France in June 1940, Kreidberg and Henry have noted that, "there was a swing in public opinion throughout the country and in the Congress towards greater defense preparedness" (1955:570). And while the need for defense preparedness was understood, public opinion favored military assistance to the Allies without United States intervention. Neutrality legislation gave way to the Lend-Lease Program of March 1941, which allowed the Allies and eventually the Chinese and Soviets to acquire U.S. arms and munitions even if the countries could not afford to purchase the items.

During the period between the fall of France and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President and Congress started to prepare the country for war by passing significant military oriented legislation. However, preparations for the United States entrance into war actually started way before World War II began. After World War I, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920. This Act was a framework under which a military "could be drafted in another emergency, rather more efficiently and quickly than had been the case in 1917" (Millis, 1956:242). The Act set

the size and structure of the military, but more importantly it stated who was responsible for future mobilization planning. Mobilization responsibilities had been assigned to both the Assistant Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff. In 1921, responsibilities were further defined by the War Department as follows:

The General Staff [belongs to Chief of Staff] was to determine what material was needed and when; the Assistant Secretary of the Army was to ensure that the material was delivered in the types, quantities, and priorities desired. All military aspects of mobilization pertained to the General Staff; all business and industrial aspects of mobilization pertained to the Assistant Secretary of War. (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:381)

And while little was done in the government to maintain authorized military strength and readiness after World War I, the War Department was at least able to plan for the next war. Planning was done based on a mobilization concept similar to World War I. Mobilization would begin with declaration of hostilities. The General Staff continued to revise plans throughout the interwar period and published Military Mobilization Plans in 1922, 1923, 1924, 1928, 1933, 1938, and 1939. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of War used his planning branch, the Army Industrial College, and the Army and Navy Munitions board to develop industrial mobilization plans, subsequently published in 1924, 1928, 1930, 1933, 1936, and 1939 (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:377-514).

President Roosevelt chose to gradually mobilize the military and industry in a piecemeal fashion rather than

follow the War Department's mobilization plans. The plans had been developed for a specific day that marked transition from peace to war, in line with how the last two wars had been conducted. And while such plans were politically unacceptable in 1939, since the United States was not about to join in a war just because Hitler invaded Poland, at least the plans could help guide what preparations were taken.

With the fall of France in June 1940, prewar mobilization legislation and planning began in earnest. The Army had not been reequipped since World War I and in June 1940, Congress authorized \$2.75 billion dollars to the Army for equipment modernization (20 times more than the normal annual budget of the last few years) (Perret, 1989:357). Also in June, the President and Congress approved the activation of the National Guard to Federal Service against the wishes of the Army planners. The Army did not have the equipment and personnel on hand to train new units (itself having just increased from 165,000 regular troops to 265,000 over an 18 month period). The President and Congress overruled the Army because they "saw manpower mobilization as an essential act to awaken the public to the possibility of war, even if the immediate results of mobilization would be decreased readiness" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:396). In September 1940, Congress also passed a peacetime Selective Training and Service Act for the first time in

United States history. The above three pieces of legislation increased the Army by 1.2 million personnel in one year (June 1940-June 1941) and provided for major re-equipment of the Army for the first time since World War I.

As for the Navy, legislation started in July 1940, when Congress passed "a series of 'Two Ocean Navy' acts to double the tonnage of the Navy's combatant fleet" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:395). These Acts ended the United States adherence to the tonnage limits of the 1920 London Conference. The Acts were done in response to Germany and Japan's violations of the London Conference.

In March 1941, Congress also passed the Lend-Lease Act which President Roosevelt claimed made the United States the "Arsenal of Democracy". This Act moved the U.S. further away from neutrality, since the United States was now using its industrial might to arm the allies. But still the U.S. was not in the war. In August 1941, Congress extended the Selective Service Act so that those who had been drafted in 1940 did not have to be released when their required one year tour was up. No other significant legislation was passed until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Until after Pearl Harbor, industrial mobilization proceeded without government intervention and any economic guidance given the private sector was almost entirely advisory (Clem, 1983:35). During the 1939-1941 period, Roosevelt had created several agencies to control economic

mobilization, yet the United States had no coherent system of economic controls until the Office of War Mobilization was created in May 1943 (Abrahamson, 1983:133-48). The Office of War Mobilization was extremely similar to the War Resources Administration envisioned in the pre-war Industrial Mobilization Plan that had been rejected in 1940 because economic mobilization controls were unacceptable to the general public and its leadership (Clem, 1983:33-35,42).

Economic controls unacceptable in the pre-war mobilization became necessary as war progressed, culminating in the creation of the Office of War Mobilization. Materials needed for both civilian and economic use had to be rationed. Factories were retooled and production expanded while the U.S. lost over one-sixth of its male workforce to military service (over 16 million served during World War II). It therefore became necessary to defer men with critical skills such as engineers, machine tool operators, and others, and bring large numbers of women and minorities into the industrial workforce for the first time.

Military mobilization plans were also adjusted and revised to meet the needs of the gradual pre-war mobilization. Planning was not just limited to mobilization for war, several war plans were also developed, and from January to March 1941, Army and Navy planners met with their British counterparts to "hammer out the broad contours of an Allied strategy for victory in a war the United States had

not entered" (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:397). This planning ultimately resulted in a "Germany First" concept because it was felt Japan and Italy could not sustain war without Germany (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:395). In planning with Britain, the United States formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (consisting of the two Senior Navy Admirals, and the Senior Army and Army Air Force Generals) to organize for coalition and interservice operations.

In 1941, the sudden attack on Pearl Harbor demanded a response. "Germany First" was still adhered to, but a counteroffensive in the South Pacific was also planned. The United States entered the War fighting on two fronts. Planning for "Germany First" was a well integrated effort by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The planners foresaw an offensive war that included naval operations to secure control of all critical seaways and ruin the enemies' seaborne commerce, strategic bombardment to destroy air forces and war making capacity, the encouragement of resistance movements to erode their political control and land campaigns to destroy the Axis ground forces. (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:398)

The effort against Japan in the Pacific had no integration like the "Germany First" plans. The Army and Navy both agreed that a Unified Command was needed in the Pacific, but each favored a commander from their own service: the Army wanted MacArthur and the Navy wanted Nimitz. The services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deadlocked, but Roosevelt chose not to intervene. The result was no Unified Command in the Pacific. MacArthur and

Nimitz each chose to pursue their own plans with little joint coordination.

Observations on World War II. Perhaps the best lesson of World War II is that mobilization plans, war plans, and even partial mobilization can be conducted by a neutral country, without necessarily dragging the country into war. Pre-war mobilization planning (both economic and manpower) helped to prepare the United States for war, but would have been more effective if provisions had been made for partial mobilizations. All planning assumed declaration of war and all-out mobilization, a plan that would have been good for World War I. The political leadership of World War II was different from World War I, however, and Roosevelt felt increased readiness was a deterrent for war. Yet, Roosevelt could not realistically expect the country to allow massive mobilization efforts during peacetime. Therefore, the pre-war plans could only be used as guidelines for ideas in the implementation of partial mobilization prior to declaration of war. As the U.S. had discovered in World War I, economic mobilization must be coordinated with manpower mobilization to ensure a ready force. Critical skills in industry and agriculture needed to be identified, and workers possessing those skills protected from selective service to sustain a long term economic mobilization. Additionally, the workforce to take

over non-critical skilled work had to be identified and trained early in the mobilization effort.

World War II was the first war where foreign and military policy were integrated. The United States actively prepared for conflict as the diplomatic situation between itself and Germany deteriorated, rather than waiting to prepare until declaration of war. Unfortunately, once war was declared, unity of effort at the interservice level was dependent upon the theater. In the European theater, the "Germany First" strategy characterized centralized planning and emphasized coordinated efforts in both coalition and interservice operations. However, the Pacific theater had no centralization of planning and effort since there was never one unified commander such as the European theater had.

Korean War. As the postwar and Cold War era unfolded there was a tendency for the American public to:

consider the American nuclear monopoly as the primary deterrent to direct Soviet action and to think only in terms of total war. Obversely, the possibility of lesser conflicts in which the bomb would either be neither politically or militarily relevant was almost completely disregarded.
(Matloff, 1973:540)

Thus, while the potential for conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union remained a possibility in the minds of the national leaders and the public, little was done to maintain the nation's non-nuclear defense industrial base. In demobilizing at the end of World War II, policy

concentrated on stimulating the civilian economy to include wholesale disposal of government owned industrial facilities. Facilities not sold were allowed to deteriorate rather than be maintained for future use (Clem, 1983:52).

Yet monopoly of the bomb was short lived; the Soviets exploded a nuclear weapon in the fall of 1949. The United States had committed itself to containment of communism in 1947, but had lost China in 1949. Hence, when Communist backed North Korea attacked South Korea, Truman felt that the United States must support South Korea to contain further communist adventurism. This decision made U.S. commitment to containment more credible to European Allies, and was popular in the United States.

The decision to intervene provided reassurance that despite setbacks such as the 'loss' of China to Communism and the Soviet Union's entry into the atomic club the United States had not lost the will to hang tough in the Cold War. (Parret, 1989:456,469)

However, popular support soon eroded, for the American public saw a prolonged war that appeared to have no successful end in sight, and Truman eventually decided not to seek reelection (Osborn, 1987:85-86).

Many policies to correct World War II mobilization deficiencies were passed during the five years between the end of World War II and the start of the Korean War. In 1946, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act was passed to approve acquisition and maintenance of strategic materials. Furthermore, the National Defense Act

of 1947 (with revisions in 1949), established the Department of Defense and the Air Force. With the Act, the position of Secretary of Defense was created, with authority over all the services, and the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was mandated by law. The Act laid the foundation for greater interservice cooperation and unified effort than ever known before in U.S. history. In 1947, the Armed Forces Procurement Act was passed giving the Department of Defense a means of protecting critical elements of the defense industrial base by granting contracts exempt from competitive bidding for these elements. In 1948, the National Industrial Reserve Act authorized the Department of Defense to keep surplus manufacturing tools and equipment, and industrial plants required for emergency production needs. While these Acts were put in place to help eliminate future mobilization problems, those that required money were not adequately funded (Clem, 1983:52-53).

At the start of the Korean War, plans were still based on total mobilization of the country for war, very similar in concept to World War II. Plans for limited war and partial mobilization did not exist and therefore the Korean mobilization became an improvised process (Heymont and McGregor, 1972: Chap 3-2,13).

Because Selective Service had been reinstituted in 1948 when the services had trouble meeting minimum enlistment levels, the mechanism for expanding military manpower needs

was already in place. In addition, a personnel policy was devised for the limited manpower mobilization of the Korean War: a rotation policy that would transfer personnel out of Korea after six months of combat or twelve months of noncombat service. Ostensibly, the policy was designed to promote morale of the troops and preclude forcing a small segment of the population to fight the war indefinitely (Gough, 1987:42-44).

When the United States entered the Korean War in 1950, it was the catalyst for significant mobilization policy change. The United States was not just mobilizing for the Korean War, but also rearming and expanding its industrial mobilization base for a possible full-scale war with the Soviet Union. Emphasis was placed on maintaining an industrial base that could support an all out war and still allow economic growth in the civilian sector (Clem, 1983:57-58, 62; Millett and Maslowski, 1984:484-85). This was the first time in U.S. history that preparedness was based on peacetime commitment and long term readiness for possible war (Clem, 1983:67).

Observations About the Korean War. The Korean War showed the need for not just mobilization plans, but plans ranging from a very limited war effort to total war. Interestingly enough, planning for war after World War II was based on the total war concept implemented during World War I and World War II, yet U.S. policy required only

limited U.S. commitment in Korea. The United States entered the war to save South Korea from communism, not to defeat communism, and U.S. policy formulated during this time stressed containment. Containment required only partial mobilization, but also required continuance of high peacetime readiness posture both in military personnel and in the industrial base to ensure that the country could quickly respond to communist aggression anywhere in the world.

To make the limited war concept of Korea equitable, a rotation policy was initiated. Personnel no longer fought for the duration of the war as in the last two wars.

Initially, the public supported President Truman's decision to use military force to save South Korea from communist domination. However, this was the United States first war with a limited, ill-defined objective. Containment was not the same as fighting to decisively win, and could conceivably drag on forever. Within two years public support for the war had eroded, and the public wanted the United States out of the war and Truman out of office.

Mobilizations Since The Korean War. There have been three limited mobilizations since the Korean War that involved partial mobilization of reserve forces: the Berlin Crisis of 1961, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. While each has placed limited demands on the United States, each contains political and policy lessons for mobilizations.

Berlin Crisis. In 1961 President Kennedy did a limited call-up of 250,000 reservists in response to the erection of the Berlin Wall. The call-up was done to increase U.S. readiness and as a diplomatic signal to the Soviets that the U.S. would not leave Berlin. President Kennedy's response was supported by the American Public.

There was no plan for a partial mobilization. Air Force and Navy reservists showed reasonable readiness, but the lack of personnel and training equipment in Army units created a situation where the units were not ready to train when mobilized. As a result of this mobilization, the Army developed a Partial Mobilization Plan in 1962 (Haymont and McGregor, 1972:4-2).

Vietnam. While the U.S. had advisors in South Vietnam starting as early as 1956, gradual escalation of conflict between North and South Vietnam did not enter U.S. combat troops directly into the conflict until 1965. Though President Johnson did not want war interfering with his social programs, he also did not want to be known as a president who lost a country to communism. As a result, on the advice of the State Department, Johnson sent combat troops into Vietnam (Davidson, 1988:335). Johnson quietly involved the U.S. without trying to rally the American people behind the war, yet his decision still received general public support (Davidson, 1988:451). However, by 1967 more Americans opposed the war than supported it.

The shift in public opinion came about in part because the public saw that more and more casualties were coming back from Vietnam, that draft calls were increasing, and that no real progress was being made in the war. Historians believe that support of the war ended with the Tet offensive because Tet shattered the image that the U.S. was winning the fight to contain communism in Vietnam (Davidson, 1988:484-489). Thus by 1968, the public became disillusioned with the conduct of the war and wanted a solution to get the United States out. And just as public dissatisfaction over the Korean war had caused Truman not to seek reelection, dissatisfaction over Vietnam caused Johnson to do the same (Osborn, 1986:86).

A Partial Mobilization Plan had been developed based on the Berlin Crisis mobilization of 1961, but the plan was not used. President Johnson would not allow the reserves to be mobilized in 1965, nor would he allow wartime economic constraints, for, as stated earlier, Johnson wanted his social reforms to proceed. Buildup consisted of a gradual expansion of the number of Regular personnel (career and draftees), and a limited call up of reserve units in 1968 (less than one percent of total active force). Not calling up the Reserves significantly affected the Army, since the Army was designed to use reserve components for logistical and training support:

The regular Army was not organized to fight a war on the scale of Vietnam without mobilization of

some reserve units and specialists. By 1966, other Regular Army units had been stripped of logistical support and especially military construction units for Vietnam. (Weigley, 1967:534)

And military capability may have been further eroded by the thirteen month rotation policy, which made survival, not success, the goal and diminished institutional memory within fighting units (Perret:1989:531).

Observations about Berlin and Vietnam. The Berlin Crisis shows that the United States still needs to prepare partial mobilization plans, while Vietnam shows that even when plans are ready, they may not be used because of political concerns. When the military structure is based on the mobilization plan, and reliance is placed on the capabilities of non-mobilized assets, hardships can occur. Not using the National Guard and Reserve to provide logistics support placed a strain on U.S. logistics activities world wide.

Initial public support occurred, even without active leadership by Johnson to rally it. However, just as in Korea, public support eroded. Long involvements in limited war appears to cause public acceptance of Presidential leadership to erode, even to the point that the President may not seek reelection. This scenario fits both Truman during the Korean War and Johnson during Vietnam.

Desert Storm. By 1990, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union began dismantling its communist apparatus and

converting to a capitalist economy. Yet while the conflicts of the Cold War were disappearing, regional conflicts throughout the world were still present. In the Persian Gulf region, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. By 5 August, President Bush had formulated the United States national policy response and announced it to the nation. On 6 August, President Bush ordered combat forces into Saudi Arabia (with consent of the Saudi's) and the Gulf Region and Forces started to arrive in the area as early as 7 August. Mobilization plans were activated on 22 August when President Bush called up the forces from the National Guard and Reserve forces to help support Operation Desert Shield. Opinion polls showed that the majority of the country supported President Bush's decision to send troops into the Persian Gulf.

Policy decisions effecting the Desert Shield mobilization started in 1973 when the Department of Defense adopted the Total Force Policy as a cornerstone of national defense policy (Conduct of Gulf War, 1992:H-1). This policy made reserve forces an integral part of U.S. military response, equipped reserve forces with modern equipment, and insured the forces were properly manned and funded. Additionally, mobilization plans such as the Army's FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System were developed to quickly mobilize reserve forces. Actual equipment modernization started with President Carter and was expanded

by President Reagan to provide active and reserve forces with the first major peacetime equipment modernization in U.S. history.

1973 was also the year the United States officially went back to all-volunteer forces. All-volunteer forces have been able to sustain the active and reserve force requirements, though quality of volunteers fluctuated considerably until the mid 1980's when the volunteer recruit quality, in terms of education and aptitude, became slightly higher than the national average. Recruit quality has remained at this level since 1983, and has a direct correlation to increased combat performance (Kruzel, 1988:158-60). The end result was that the Department of Defense could claim that the all-volunteer force fielded in Operation Desert Storm was "the highest quality fighting force the United States has ever fielded" (DOD, Conduct of Gulf War, 1992:xvii).

In 1986, Congress passed the Nichols-Goldwater Act to strengthen and unify the authority of senior civilian and military officials in the Department of Defense, and required the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prioritize resource allocations in order to consolidate the acquisition process with the Department of Defense and ensure greater effectiveness in Joint Operations planning (Kruzel, 1988:172-174; DOD, Conduct of Gulf War, 1992:D-8). Additionally, the Act clarified command relationships so

that in Operation Desert Storm, all military operations were controlled by one commander, thereby providing unity of effort.

Observations About Desert Storm. The Nichols-Goldwater Act is part of continued revisions of the National Defense Act of 1947 and appears to have fine-tuned some of the command, planning, and resource allocation problems seen in other conflicts. This was the first time any President had mobilized forces under The Total Force Policy, and mobilization plans to activate and use Reserve and National Guard units, such as the Army's FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System, worked. Reserve and National Guard units activated were ready to deploy and able to perform their wartime missions.

As with all previous wars, the public supported the President's decision to send troops into the Gulf region.

Conclusion. For each of the six major conflicts the United States has mobilized for since 1890, the Presidential decision to enter each has always received initial support from a majority of the populace. Not only does this observation hold true for wars the populace had prior knowledge about (Spanish-American, World War I, and World War II), but also those wars where the general public knew little if anything until Presidential announcement of military action (Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm).

However, initial acceptance does not mean long-term commitment. Of the three wars lasting more than two years (World War II, Korea, and Vietnam), only World War II had support throughout. One reason for the differing levels of public support among the wars appears to stem from the commitment required by the population and the justification for the war. In World War II, the whole nation had to make sacrifices --rationing consumer goods-- and the Country was fighting to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese. In Korea and Vietnam, the United States asked the general population to make few material sacrifices, and the country was asked to fight to contain an ideology, communism, rather than defeat another country.

Presidential leadership style often determines not only when military force will be used and what plans will be implemented, but also what will be politically acceptable. Planners need to realize that political considerations kept every pre-war mobilization plan until Desert Storm from being implemented in even a general sense. The President, and his security advisors, give preliminary guidance and approval of final plans. But what happens when the Presidential ideologies change? In our readings we have seen no policy, though there may be one, that ensures all major mobilization plans get a White House review when a change in power occurs. While many plans would be updated as the new President provides preliminary guidance, planning

areas not discussed could be currently unacceptable to the President and not realized until the plan is required.

Mobilization planning has become increasingly important since the Spanish-American War. Manpower mobilization is perhaps the one form of mobilization that is the easiest to plan for. Even without a manpower plan, the United States historically has vastly expanded trained combat manpower in less than a year to meet the demands of the Spanish-American War, World War I, and the Korean War. With the Total Force Policy and manpower mobilizations plans currently covering the gamut from partial mobilization to full mobilization, the United States appears able to rapidly mobilize the manpower it needs for any emergency. One manpower related area that could benefit from further refinement is the rotation policy. Decisions about length of term and whether to use individual or unit replacement still needs to be well thought out.

Equipping a large mobilized force with modern weapon systems will not be as easy. In all wars, economic or industrial mobilization has taken approximately two years to reach full production and provide all weapon systems and transportation assets required. Economic planning and maintenance of the military industrial base is viewed as essential, yet no long term acceptable political industrial policy has been formulated by national leaders, and the current United States industrial base appears to be in

decline. Eventually, the United States may need a national industrial policy to ensure that the industrial base does not decline in areas critical to economic sustainment and national defense.

Congress, while not ready to institute a national industrial policy, has tried to help in the industrial mobilization process with the Nichols-Goldwater Act. The Act is one in a series that has consolidated and unified control of the military services. One portion of this act places acquisitions for all military services under the control of a single acquisition official. This allows for a single acquisition plan rather than several competing single service plans and may help in development of an industrial mobilization plan.

The Nichols-Goldwater Act also solidified senior level authority within the Department of Defense and appears to have finally achieved unified military effort, something that Congress has been trying to create since the Spanish-American War.

Military Manpower Procurement

Introduction. Griffith quotes historian John Keegan as having identified "six generic military manpower systems by which nations have raised armies over time: warrior, slave, mercenary, regular, militia, and conscript" (1988:7). He goes on to list five manpower systems that emerged in the United States: the militia, the standing army with

volunteer reserves, the volunteer force, permanent peacetime draft, and the all-volunteer force (1988:8-38). In this section only those systems applicable to mobilization for war will be discussed.

The militia was the system of the early colonies and worked as long as the fighting was close to home. The revolutionary war was fought with a mixture of regulars and militia. The federal government had little or no control over the militia, which were state controlled. The militia system, in the form of all men obligated to perform military service for the state, was in decline by the Civil War, and slowly changed to a volunteer system. The Civil War also saw the first large scale introduction of conscription, although with many loopholes, such as the ability to "commute" (to pay a fee in lieu of military service).

After the Civil War many professional officers blamed the length of the war and its carnage on "the necessity to resort to using armies of hastily called volunteers led largely by militia or volunteer officers" (Griffith, 1988:20). These regular officers called for a strong professional army. However, the militia and volunteer principles were still popular. Voluntary militia units were now called "national guard" in many states. Its supporters believed that "the solution to the nation's military needs continued to rest with the citizen soldier" (Griffith, 1988:20). The leaders of the Guard justified its purpose as

the legitimate reserve of the regular army and sought and received federal funds to equip Guard units.

This section will show how military and civilian leaders dealt with various manpower problems from the Spanish-American War until the present. We will show how these leaders first came to embrace conscription, and then abandon it. Further, this section will demonstrate how volunteerism remained strong throughout all discussed periods, and why it frequently caused problems. Also, how peace-time neglect of the armed forces required periods of build-up when forces were called upon will be discussed. Finally, we will show how the reserve components came under ever-increasing federal control as a direct result of problems similar to those mentioned above.

Spanish-American War. Army leaders recognized that conscription would be difficult to achieve in the political climate of the time. But, in an attempt to avoid the problems with volunteer units in earlier expansions, they strove for authority for direct enlistment in the expanded regular army. These plans were circumvented by Guard supporters, now represented by the then recently formed National Guard Association. On 22 April 1898, Congress passed the Volunteer Act which gave volunteering Guard units priority over individuals when filling state quotas.

As in previous expansions, problems soon surfaced. "Many Guard units arrived at the mobilization rendezvous

under strength, irregularly equipped, and poorly trained" (Griffith, 1988:21). As a result, while most of the volunteers came from the Guard, few were sent overseas as units. After the war, "observers agreed that only the weakness of the enemy spared the United States from a military disaster of major proportions" (Griffith, 1988:21).

World War I. In spite of strong public sentiments for volunteerism, General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Secretary of War Newton Baker convinced President Wilson that wartime conscription was necessary. Wilson agreed for two reasons. First, he felt a draft would be more efficient and equitable than the traditionally chaotic volunteer system. Second:

he knew that former President Theodore Roosevelt, himself one of those amateur officers in the Spanish-American War, and a leading critic of Wilson's military policy, ached to raise a volunteer force and lead it in France. (Griffith, 1988:22)

The task of drafting legislation fell to Major General E. H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the Army. He studied the Civil War conscription after action reports in an attempt to avoid similar problems. Although seeing volunteerism as a problem, he left both the regular army and the Guard open to voluntary enlistment because of strong public sentiment, but he prohibited bounties (fees for enlistment). Bounties were a serious problem during the Civil War when men deserted and then reenlisted over and over again to collect a bounty. To make the draft more

equitable, Crowder eliminated substitution and commutation. Finally, he made administration of the program the responsibility of local draft boards (Griffith, 1988:22-23).

President Wilson signed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, four weeks after declaration of war with the Central Powers (Ebel, 1988:173). All men aged 21 to 30 were eligible and 10 million men registered on the first registration date, 5 June 1917. In June 1918 another 900,000 had reached draft age and were registered. By September 1918 eligibility was extended to all men between 18 and 45 years of age, thus another 13 million could be registered. Of all the men registered, 2,810,296 were inducted into the armed forces (Ebel, 1988:173), and of these 2,801,373 went to the Army, supplying 67 percent of its manpower (Griffith, 1988:23).

About halfway through the war voluntary enlistment of draft eligible men was prohibited and voluntary enlistment was stopped altogether at the end of the war.

The World War I draft was based on the theory of selection. Local boards had guidelines that intended to preserve manpower for the civilian economy until military needs became dominant. Thus people that could be spared easiest went first. However, only very few were exempted outright, while some occupations were exempted at Presidential discretion (Ebel, 1988:173).

Even though the draft was administered in a decentralized manner, it, for the first time, gave the federal government significant wartime control over military manpower (Griffith, 1988:23).

World War II. Between the wars the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy had reverted to volunteer recruitment, but contingency plans were maintained to start a draft in case of armed conflict. As a result of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940, many called for the first peacetime conscription in this country. There was strong opposition at first, even General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, initially objected to a peacetime draft. But when army planners concluded that volunteerism would not provide sufficient manpower for a rapid buildup of the Army and National Guard, Marshall changed his position and also called for a peacetime draft. Finally, when France fell, proponents of the draft won the upper hand. On 14 September 1940, the Senate passed the Selective Training and Service Act. President Roosevelt signed the act two days later and issued a proclamation calling for the first registration to take place on 16 October (Griffith, 1988:24-25).

All men between 21 and 35 were required to register and over 16 million subsequently came forward. Soon thereafter a lottery drawing was held to determine the order of induction. Another registration, with subsequent lottery

drawing, for new 21-year-old men was held in July 1941 (Ebel, 1988:175-176).

Since it was a peacetime draft, several restrictions were imposed. A maximum of 900,000 men could be called for training at one time, they could not be sent outside the United States, and could only serve for one year. In July 1941 Congress allowed for the extension of terms of service for Guard and Army personnel already on active duty.

Six days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, on 13 December 1941, Congress again changed the act to allow for the use of conscripts outside U.S. territory (Griffith, 1988:25-26). Later the age limits were changed to 18 and 65 (those 18 to 37 were obligated to serve, the registration of older men served as an indication of available civilian manpower) (Falk, 1966:140). By the end of the war over 45 million men had been registered. Almost 10 million of these men served in the armed services, supplying nearly two thirds of the armed services' manpower.

As in World War I, voluntary enlistment initially was not prohibited and many draft-eligibles volunteered for the service or the occupational field of their choice. The main beneficiaries of this opportunity were the Navy and Marine Corps, which "were not brought under the draft until a year after" the war had started (Falk, 1966:142). Another beneficiary was the Army Air Corps. Due to the mistaken public belief that all Air Corps personnel were aviators,

recruiters were swamped with volunteers for the Air Corps. Millett and Murray also state that "Throughout the war the navy, marine corps, and the army air forces [sic] received a disproportionate share of quality manpower" (1988:60).

Finally, Secretary of War Stimson and the War Manpower Commission were able to convince President Roosevelt that volunteering was disruptive and wasted resources. Roosevelt limited the practice and by December 1942 prohibited volunteering for draft-age men altogether. Thus, after 1 January 1943, a draft-eligible man could only volunteer for the draft, moving his name to the top of the list, but not for any particular service (Ebel, 1988:176-177).

However, men could still volunteer for specific services or skills before they were draft-eligible. Thus, by the time they became eligible, many of the high quality individuals had been accepted into the more popular services and service components (Falk, 1966:140-142). Millett and Murray point out:

General McNair correctly predicted as early as 1943 not only that Army combat divisions had too few trained replacements, but that their substandard enlisted personnel would limit their combat power and increase their casualties. Not until late 1944, having suffered prohibitive casualties in France, did the army cull some 250,000 high-quality personnel from other assignments and place them in combat billets. Only draconian reassignments kept the infantry and armored divisions in Europe competitive with the German Army. (1988:61)

That combat effectiveness was reduced is confirmed by Dupuy who asserted that German combat effectiveness was about 20

percent higher than the effectiveness of American troops (1985,57-70,163).

Millett and Murray further contend that:

the army's senior commanders allowed the USAAF's strategic bombing offensive to starve both tactical aviation and the ground forces of quality personnel and equipment. (1988:76)

Although problems existed, during the Second World War Selective Service again had the task of placing the needs of the nation over the desires of the individual. While peacetime deferments were liberal, they became more stringent as the war went on, and deferments were added or deleted as requirements dictated. In addition, any deferment was subject to review. For example, as more women started working in defense plants, previously deferred male defense workers lost their deferments. The Selective Service thus had the dual task of providing manpower for the war as well as insuring that sufficient manpower would be available for defense industries (Griffith, 1988:23-26; Ebel, 1988:175-177).

The Korean Conflict. The Selective Training and Service Act was allowed to expire in March 1947 in hopes that sufficient volunteers would flock to the services. But by 1948 a new Selective Service Act was enacted because voluntary enlistments had been insufficient. The act was due to expire in 1950 but was extended to 1951. By that year, 735,000 men had been inducted. In June 1951, Congress made some substantial changes and changed the name from

Selective Service Act to the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Under the new act, active service was to be 24 months rather than the 21 months of the 1948 act, while some deferments, such as the one for men with wives but no children, were deleted, and the age limit lowered from 19 years to 18 and a half (Ebel, 1988:178).

Falk points out that the relatively short period of service and low selection standards "made for a progressive diminution of skill, experience, and intelligence in the enlisted ranks of the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Marines" (1966:143). This was the case until 1958 when Congress allowed for stricter qualitative standards, which according to Falk resulted in a striking rise in the proportion "both of enlistees and of inductees now [1966] found in the upper 3 of the 5 mental groups into which the armed services classify their personnel" (1966:108). He further notes that the Navy and the Air Force had fewer problems because of "their greater attraction for higher caliber volunteers" (1966:143).

By the end of the war in July 1953, 1.5 million men had been drafted, providing over one fourth of the total armed services manpower. The 1951 act was to remain in effect only for four years, but by this time, the peace time draft had been firmly established for the United States.

The director of the Selective Service, General Lewis Hershey, not only aimed to provide manpower to the armed

services and defense industries but also saw it as a way to influence other areas related to national security. For example, paternity deferments strengthened the family, while student deferments provided for increased study of science and technology (Griffith, 1988:28-30; Ebel, 1988:177-178).

The Vietnam Era. Since draft call-ups had become infrequent, controversy about the draft had subsided. However, around 1965, to provide manpower for the increased military commitment in Vietnam, President Johnson decided to build up the active force rather than call any reserve components to active duty. Subsequently, draft calls increased in 1966 to more than three times the previous level. As before, most inductees went to the Army, the Marine Corps received 19,600 of the almost 340,000 men inducted, and the Navy received only 2,600. Both these services, as well as the Air Force, required few conscripts because many men choose to volunteer for these services rather than risk being drafted into the Army's combat arms.

As inductions and casualties rose, the public again took an interest in the Selective Service. Deferments that had been instituted to avoid drafting people when manpower requirements decreased while eligibles increased, now came under close scrutiny. Various groups pointed out that because of deferments, such as the one for college students, the weight of the draft fell to a larger extent on blue collar and minority men (Griffith, 1988:30-31).

Groups opposed to the draft also pointed out the casualty rate among draftees increased disproportionately when compared to volunteers. In 1965, 28 percent of Army battle deaths were draftees, in 1966 draftee battle deaths rose to 34 percent and to 57 percent by 1967 (Griffith, 1988:31). Griffith points out that the reason for this was that volunteers were able to choose their assignments, and often chose non-combat specialties, leaving a disproportionate number of combat specialties to be filled by draft inductees (Griffith, 1988:30-32).

Criticism of the undeclared war, seen by many as not presenting a "clear and present danger to the United States" further fueled opposition to the draft.

Various groups started studying alternatives. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had directed a study of the issue in 1964. That study had found that only about 11 percent of the services' requirements had to come from inductees, a figure that could be decreased to zero by alternate means. However, because of the projected increased costs of these means (i.e. higher pay and more civilian DoD employees), the study group decided against ending Selective Service (Griffith, 1988:30). By 1967, members of Congress intensively studied various proposals. By 1968 both parties--Republican and Democrat--offered various draft reform measures.

President Nixon, shortly after taking office, appointed the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The Gates Commission, as it later came to be called, was to make a plan to move toward an all-volunteer force. To do so, it found, would require substantial increases in pay, living, and working conditions (Griffith, 1988:29-33).

President Nixon also initiated the use of the lottery drawing to remedy some of the problems of the draft. The first drawing (since 1941) was held on 1 December 1969. The lottery system removed some of the uncertainty caused by long term draft eligibility because the lottery number would tell a man how likely he was to be drafted, and did so in his first year of eligibility. Subsequently, other problems were corrected by abolishing or modifying many deferments (Ebel, 1988:179-180).

By 1970, only the Army was relying on the draft, although volunteers for the other services undoubtedly were motivated by the draft as well. In 1968, General Westmoreland had directed a study of the issue and was told the volunteer system might work, although at a significant cost increase. Another factor for the Army was an increase in discipline and morale problems that could perhaps be resolved easier in a volunteer force. Although the Army was agreeable to the general concept of the all-volunteer force, it argued that the Gates Commission seriously underestimated the costs of the concept as well as underestimated the

concept's impact on reserve components (who also were indirectly filled by the draft).

President Nixon, on 23 April 1970, announced that the draft could not be ended on the expiration date of the Selective Service Act, 30 June 1971, but requested funds for a 20 percent pay raise of selected grades as well as other initiatives to move toward the all-volunteer force. After much debate in Congress, the bill was passed and signed by President Nixon in September 1971. However, by the time the war ended in 1973, the end of the draft had come as well (Griffith, 1988:33-37).

Desert Storm. Operation Desert Storm, the war to liberate Kuwait, demonstrated the capabilities of the Total Force Policy. Previous military actions, such as the invasion of Grenada, had used primarily active duty forces. These active forces had been built up as a result of the Cold War. Although the size of the Armed Services was already declining, large numbers of well-trained people were still available to conduct the war. Much of the logistics support, however, came from reserve units.

In accordance with Total Force policy, on 22 August 1990 President Bush authorized the call-up of a maximum of 50,050 reserve personnel to active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield (10,500 volunteers were already on active duty). These numbers were subsequently increased and according to the Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

by 24 January 1991 total Service authorizations had reached 361,988 Reservists. By the start of ground combat operations, 202,337 Selected Reservists and 20,277 Individual Ready Reservists had been called to active duty. Of these, 106,000 (46%) served in the theater of operations. While most units were generally combat-ready and deployable on short notice, some Reserve component ground combat units required additional training time. Reserve components participated in many mission areas but were particularly concentrated in support functions. For example, in August 1990 (the month of first Reserve call-up) already 40 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of air refueling missions were flown by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve crews (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1991:28-32).

While the use of Reserve Components during Desert Shield/Storm was perhaps more successful than any other use of reserve manpower in American history, the Reserve Forces Policy Board does point out some problems. In an attempt to avoid unnecessary activations only individuals or selected portions of a unit were called up. While this posed few problems in the Naval Reserve, where units primarily only serve administrative purposes. Air Force, Army, and Marine units suffered from selective activation because their units trained together. Frequently, "adequate command and administrative infrastructure" was not activated with unit

segments, other times the remaining Reserve unit was unable to perform its assigned mission or had difficulty supporting additional taskings because of this selective activation. Not to be neglected is the loss of unit morale by separating Reservists who had trained together for a long time. Units pieced together out of activated segments were not able to develop strong unit cohesion in the short time they had to train together (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1991:32-34; Hagel, 1992:3).

Conclusion. Several trends can be identified in this study of mobilization. A trend toward, and then away, from conscription can be seen. Also observable is the strong tendency toward volunteerism, an admirable but problematic concept. Another trend is the need for periods of build-up before actual readiness due to peace-time neglect. Finally, a trend toward increased federal control can be demonstrated.

The Spanish-American War provided the impetus to turn away from the goal of a primarily volunteer and militia supported military, and began the trend toward conscription. World War I saw the implementation of the first efficient conscription system; however, it was limited to wartime. By World War II a limited peacetime conscription system had been produced that prepared the nation for wartime conscription. Both world wars relied extensively on conscription. After the two big wars, the need for

conscription decreased and questions of equitable application of the draft started to surface. Finally, in 1973, conscription was eliminated altogether. But the Selective Service is operationally ready if necessary.

Throughout the studied time period volunteerism had only been eliminated briefly. Volunteerism, perhaps, comes from the American idea that if the will is present a way will be found. Many have seen conscription as "un-American." However, while volunteers often performed well for the Armed Services, whole volunteer units often were evaluated less favorably. Another problem created by volunteerism was that the most capable individuals usually avoided the Army, or if in the Army, the combat arms. Therefore, draftees with lower abilities appear over-represented in combat specialties which may have led to some unnecessary casualties.

Another trend that can be observed is that due to the comparative neglect of military issues in peace-time, extended periods of build-up were necessary. During the last 40 years, the Cold War, a state of elevated military preparedness provided for increased readiness.

Finally, in the last hundred years federal control increased. While initially the Federal Government had difficulties exercising control over available manpower, by World War I federal control had been largely achieved and has been strengthened since.

Training

Introduction. The previous section discussed how manpower was acquired for the armed conflicts since the Spanish-American War. This section will deal primarily with the training of these forces. Generally, the Nation was ill-prepared for war. Of the services, the Navy, as "first line of defense" (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1047), was better funded than the Army. It was later followed by the Air Force whose claim for better funding rested on its ability to provide nuclear deterrence. The Army, on the other hand, suffered from the perpetual distrust the American people have for large standing armies and was rarely adequately funded during times of peace.

The Spanish-American War unearthed many problems with the traditional militia system and initiated a series of reforms throughout the twentieth century which resulted in more federal control over all reserve forces.

The First World War required the use of an efficient war-time conscription system, called selective service, for the first time. Its slow implementation, however, greatly increased the training burden the military services faced.

By World War II, selective service was resurrected, and started in peacetime; even so, the rapid increase in manpower again strained training systems.

In Korea, World War II veterans had to shoulder the initial burden of the war, because an insufficient number of

trained reservists were available. Many of these veterans resented going to go to war twice while others escaped their national duty. Korea also saw the reintroduction of a rotation system, abandoned since the Spanish-American War, that multiplied the training burden.

In Vietnam, as in Korea, the rotation system led to a deterioration of unit cohesion and of the level of training. Most troops returned home just as they had become fully proficient.

Desert Storm found the services better prepared than ever before, and while some problems existed, the Cold War had left the services in an increased state of readiness.

Thus training played an important role in each of the mentioned conflicts, and the lack of training significantly altered the course of some.

Spanish-American War. Prior to the Spanish-American War the Army was prepared and trained to fight the Indians, the most immediate threat to the country. Even as the U.S. moved closer to war with Spain, the Army's training still did little to prepare for a confrontation larger than the Indian fighting had required.

The Navy was structured to protect shipping and overseas interests and had benefited from earlier building programs. Therefore, it was prepared for the upcoming war and was superior to the outdated Spanish navy.

The U.S. declared war on Spain on 21 April 1898, following a chain of events that was set off when the Maine blew up in Havana Harbor on 15 February 1898. This event itself had been preceded by two years of mounting tension between the U.S. and Spain. As of 1 April 1898, the Regular Army had 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, for a total of 28,183, organized in 42 regiments. This force was scattered over some 80 posts, most of them in the West where they had remained since the pacification of the Indians only a few years prior (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:148-150).

Kreidberg and Henry report concerning the preparedness of the Regular Army troops that these troops were:

individually, at a fair standard of efficiency as a result of years of Indian campaigning. Tactically they were almost totally devoid of any but minor maneuver experience. Field maneuvers by regiments were almost unknown. Only the Civil War veterans had ever seen a force much larger than a regiment. (1955:153)

The other military force in support of the country was the organized Militia, now also called National Guard in many states (Perret, 1989:280). The Militia consisted of 9,376 officers and 106,251 enlisted men, for a total of 115,627. However, Kreidberg and Henry caution:

Equipment for the Militia was scarce and outmoded; units were below strength and had only meager training; and it appeared that it would take almost as long to place the Militia on a war footing as to organize new units. (1955:150)

On 9 April 1898, in a letter to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, Major General Nelson A. Miles,

Commanding General of the Army, recommended that all available Regular Army troops would be gathered in one camp for inspection, training, and preparation for war. He further recommended that the President call 50,000 volunteers. He felt this force of about 80,000 would be sufficient to attack the Spaniards in Cuba, whom he estimated to be of about the same strength. As the campsite for this force he recommended Chickamauga Park, Tennessee. General Miles believed another 40,000 troops, to be raised by the states, would be needed to mount coastal defenses (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:152).

Following another letter from General Miles, Secretary Alger directed the concentration of the Regular Army. However, against the recommendation of General Miles, the troops were to be gathered in four camps rather than one. This made any combined training fairly impossible since the Infantry was separated from the Cavalry and Light Artillery.

A bill was drafted to create an independent Federal volunteer force; however, due to the influence of the National Guard the act passed by Congress on 22 April 1989 provided that any Militia organization volunteering as a complete unit would have to be accepted into the Army as a whole, and that no more than one Regular officer could be appointed to any Volunteer regiment (effectively limiting the amount of training the Militia troops could have gotten from Regular troops). The act also provided for an increase

of the Regular Army to 64,719 men and a 20 percent enlisted pay increase in time of war (for more pay information see Appendix A). Later legislation allowed for the raising of a 16,500 man volunteer force of specially qualified men such as engineers (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:154-155).

Other legislation and the decision to send a force to the Philippines following Commodore George Dewey's victory in Manila Bay increased the total of Regular and Volunteer forces authorized to be mobilized to 281,200; however, this total was never reached before the end of the war (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:155-163; Perret, 1989:280).

The training level of the National Guard units was varied, but even the best trained units had not advanced past close order drill. New recruits that had been added to bring units up to strength further decreased training levels. While most of the officers had some training, their training did not compare to Regular officer training. Kreidberg and Henry quote the Inspector General's observation about National Guard officers:

They are, as a rule, zealous and fairly competent --some noticeably promising-- as far as the limited instruction and experience of the National Guard can carry them; but when all is said, they are as much in need of instruction and experience as the men under them. (1955:170)

The Inspector General also noted that many of the troops were lacking basic training in such practical requirements as extended order drill and marksmanship. Aggravating the lack of training was the lack of equipment

and uniforms. While many units had arrived with outdated equipment, some units had arrived without equipment altogether (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:167-171).

While the need for training was great, the desire of the Nation for a quick start of the campaign was greater. 16,000 men left Tampa for Cuba on 13 and 14 June 1898, with many of the training problems still unresolved.

Earlier, on 1 May 1898, Commodore Dewey, having sailed from China, had won the battle of Manila Bay, but had to wait for Army reinforcements to attack Manila itself. When Major General Wesley Merritt's troops started attacking Manila on 13 August 1898, unbeknown to them, it was only a mock-battle (although with real casualties) to placate the insurgents, an armistice between the U.S. and Spanish powers in Manila had been signed the day before. Thus, the troops were not truly tested (Perret, 1989:282-283, 288-289).

The Spanish-American War, then, was a war with an overabundance of volunteers who still saw war as a personal accomplishment and adventure rather than an organized activity to destroy the enemy. Kreidberg and Henry state:

The lack of preparedness and the hasty mobilization might have resulted in disastrous consequences if it had been for the even greater weakness of the enemy, the effectiveness of the Cuban Rebellion, and the naval victories at Manila and Santiago. (1955:173)

The following fight against insurgents in the Philippines did not follow in the same vein. Most

volunteers were replaced by regular troops as the volunteers' term of service expired.

World War I. Although the U.S. went into World War I largely unprepared, a border incident with Mexico opened the eyes of military and political leaders. In March 1916, when Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, the Regular Army was sent after Villa, under the leadership of Brigadier General John J. Pershing. To protect the home front, the entire National Guard (130,000 men) was called out. Only half the Guardsmen showed up, of those one fourth failed the Army physical. Perret points out that "The only thing it [the Guard] had no shortage of was officers." Because of this incident, some reforms were begun (1989:310-311).

In April 1917, when war was finally declared against Germany, the Army, including federalized Guard Units, had 213,557 men. By September 1917, the first selective service inductees began to arrive and by 11 November 1918 the Army had grown to 3,685,458. Even a superior training system would not have been able to handle such a large influx. Subsequently, a less than fully trained force was sent to war (Heller, 1990:16-17). Although difficult to verify, Heller believes that many of the numerous casualties can be attributed to this inadequate training (1990:16-17).

In May of 1917, the War Department had made an effort to install a cadre system. A minimum of 961 enlisted regulars were to be assigned to each newly formed Army

division. These regulars were to be drawn from existing units. The Adjutant General, however, reduced the number of regulars, mainly because not enough troops were available (Heller, 1990:17). The majority of new soldiers then received "two months training in the United States during which they never handled a rifle, fixed a bayonet or learned how to put on a gas mask" (Perret, 1989:318).

Nenninger tells of a French officer who in 1918 stated to an American colleague that:

recruiting and conscripting over 3 million men in nineteen months was "very good but not so difficult." But it was "astonishing," if not "impossible," that in the same time the United States was able to commission 200,000 officers, most of them competent. (1987:123)

These officers were trained in Officer Training Camps (OTCs) that lasted 90 days. Just five weeks after declaration of war, the first 43,000 officer candidates were admitted to these camps. The War Department gratefully accepted the help of the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) since the officers had to be trained quickly before the first conscripts started to arrive. Most new Army line officers passed through these camps, and because standards were high (commissioning rate was just over 50 percent), these camps assured consistent officer quality. However, 90 days of training hardly prepared an officer adequately for combat: leadership qualities were not sufficiently developed and tactical skill was lacking (Nenninger, 1987: 123,147).

General Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), thought it would take at least a year to adequately train a soldier. However, General March, who became Chief of Staff in 1918, thought Pershing was:

overtraining his men. March claimed, with some justice, that modern recruits and draftees were bright enough and fit enough to become competent infantrymen in six months. What he overlooked was that a division could not learn to function as a unit in less than a year.

Only the Marine Corps sent Pershing fully trained men -- 40,000 of them, and every one a qualified marksmen. (Perret, 1989:317)

Because both enlisted and officers were inadequately trained when they arrived in France, the AEF had to establish a complete education and training system, from basic infantry training to staff officer education. Even so, training was often incomplete; it was not uncommon to find soldiers who did not know how to don a gas mask or load their rifles (Heller, 1990:17-18).

To reduce the amount of time needed for American troops to participate in combat, some decisions were made that ultimately reduced their combat effectiveness. Nenninger points out that the original AEF plan was for each infantry division to go through three months of training in three one month phases (1982:149). The first month was to be small unit training, followed by a month with Allied components in defensive positions (learning trench warfare (Perret, 1989:318)), and then a month of maneuvers to prepare for attack (unlearning trench warfare). Artillery units were to

have a similar four stage training program with the last stage devoted to infantry-artillery liaison. The German 1918 spring offensive disrupted all these plans with few units reaching even the intermediate levels of training.

Due to this lack of all around training, results were frequently poor. Heller (1990:18) mentions the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division had only 200 effectives (men capable of functioning in combat) left (of 3000 men) after a three day offensive at Soissons. However, with experience results improved considerably. The training section (G-5) at General Headquarters, reported that by the time of the armistice:

Rapid progress in the art of war was everywhere to be seen. Divisions were more mobile, formations less dense; suitable maneuvers in the attack were more often seen; and vastly better advantage was taken of cover. Commanders and staff were generally more confident, and worked with greater sureness and dispatch. (Nenninger, 1987:143-144)

Lack of training also made itself known in disciplinary problems such as straggling:

One division in the Meuse-Argonne had reported an effective front-line strength of only 1,600 men. Yet when the division came out of the line and arrived in its rest area, the infantry regiments alone had over 8,400 men. (Nenninger 1987:148)

Noteworthy, however, is that General Pershing made best possible use of the small number of Regular Army officers that had attended service schools at Fort Leavenworth. Fortunately, most of his senior officers had attended one of those schools.

While the Army was struggling to expand and make up for lost time, the Navy, as the Nation's "first line of defense", had had the advantage of earlier expansion programs, but was largely unprepared for the new threat posed by German submarine attacks on U.S. vessels.

In 1916, a building program had been initiated, with 16 capital ships and 50 destroyers slated to be built. However, the first of the capital ships was not finished during the war, and the other capital ships were never started. The reason for this was the vast superiority in capital ships that the Allies already possessed. What was badly needed were destroyers to combat submarines and to provide escort to merchant ships. In addition, merchant ships were needed. Thus, instead of 16 capital ships, 300 destroyers were built before the end of the war, as well as millions of tons of merchant shipping (Millis, 1956:211).

Since the building of naval vessels, even in times of war, takes at least several months, the Navy had generally sufficient time to train the necessary crews and was in less of a predicament than the Army.

World War II. The National Defense Act of 1920 had called for a Regular Army of 260,000 enlisted and 18,000 officers, and a National Guard of 450,000 men; however, forces of this size were never funded. By mid-1939, even after some increases, the Army had only 189,839 men; these were spread over 130 locations and about 60,000 of them were

stationed outside the continental U.S. This dispersion made anything more than unit training difficult.

The National Guard had only reached 199,491 men during the same year, not because it lacked volunteers, but because of a lack of funds. At the same time the Navy had 125,202 men and the Marine Corps 19,432 (Kaune, 1990:6-7; Peppers, 1988:6).

In 1934, the Army started field army maneuvers that included both regular and Guard components training together at least once every four years. These maneuvers demonstrated a deficient number of trained command and staff officers in the Guard from the battalion level on up.

The Guard, more so than the Regular Army, suffered from a lack of modern equipment and training. Weekly meetings of one and a half hours were barely sufficient for even the most basic training tasks. Officers and enlisted men attempted to do their best with little formal training. The two weeks of annual training during the summer were valuable to develop unit cohesion and some small unit tactics, but the antiquated equipment Guard units were forced to use did little to prepare for modern warfare (Kaune, 1990:15).

As the nation moved closer to war, personnel buildup intensified but equipment stocks were still insufficient. General Marshall, Chief of Staff, stated the need for "new artillery, a semi-automatic rifle, and enough anti-tank and air defense ammunition to train the force" (Kaune, 1990:17).

By 1940, the typical Guard unit, as well as Regular units, still used broomsticks for rifles, stove pipes for mortars, telephone poles for cannons, and commercial trucks to simulate tanks during maneuvers. The Air Corps had few practice bombs and sometimes used paperbags filled with flour to bomb maneuvering troops.

These conditions only got worse when conscription started. In addition to the lack of equipment, often there were no uniforms available to clothe the new recruits. Conscription also meant that some incoming soldiers were being led by NCOs that had been conscripted only a few weeks earlier and lacked the necessary training and experience. Needless to say, morale was low among conscripted as well as regular troops (Peppers, 1988:6-7,25,27).

Kaune identifies several deficiencies identified by Army inspectors in the combined exercises: "lack of discipline, leadership, liaison, sanitation, and improper communications and supply procedures" (1990:18). These deficiencies were due to ineffectual training at the regiment level and below. Kaune also quotes General Eisenhower as saying that "the mass of officers and men lack any sense of urgency. Athletics, recreation, and entertainment took precedence in most units over serious training" (1990:20).

By 16 September 1940, the President had signed the Selective Service and Training Act, also known as the Burke-

Wadsworth bill. It provided for a total army of 1,400,000. Of these, 500,000 were to be regulars, 270,000 National Guard, and 630,000 draftees (Millis, 1956:246). Thus mobilization had begun in earnest, although the act was only a small beginning (4 million men would be called in 390 days). General Marshall considered the threat to the country to be real enough to decide not to break up Regular Army regiments to cadre new divisions. While the Regular Army absorbed many of the new recruits to bring it to wartime strength, in effect doubling its size, the majority of the training tasks fell on the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. Guard Divisions were to double in size and usually provide cadre personnel for at least one Organized Reserve Division (Kaune, 1990:20-26; Peppers, 1988:14). Gandy states that the Reserve Components grew to more than six times their original size in just one year as more than 18 divisions were raised. He further reports that four years later Reserve Component manpower had risen to 24 times the 1940 number (1991:17).

Heller identified problems with the activation of the Organized Reserve. The Army had disregarded its own plans and used the few officers that were available in the Organized Reserve as fillers in the Regular Army as well as the National Guard. Therefore, when Organized Reserve units were activated, it was really just their regimental designation that had been called; its cadre personnel had

already been used elsewhere. This, in part, caused the need to pull people from previously mobilized units (1990:31).

Kaune uses the 27th Infantry Division to demonstrate the training and development of a fairly typical National Guard Division. The 27th was called to active duty on 15 October 1940 and told to report to Fort McClellan, Alabama. Since Fort McClellan had been the home of only one Army regiment, the 27th's engineers had to first build housing and training facilities. After the call to active duty, 10,389 original Guardsmen were supplemented by 6927 new recruits; therefore, these new men first had to be trained and integrated into the unit. This training was complete in thirteen weeks. During the same time many of the older, more experienced soldiers were sent to higher headquarter staffs.

A thirteen week advanced training period followed. Throughout these periods officers were sent to various service schools to complete (or initiate) their formal training, many of them attended condensed courses, some of limited usefulness. During the advanced training period some of the unit's Springfield rifles were replaced with the new M1-Garand semi-automatic rifles.

Following the advanced training, the division took part in 2nd Army maneuvers. While these maneuvers were very beneficial for higher echelon leaders, they were less beneficial for the men, who saw them as "one long and

continuous troop movement" (Kaune, 1990:41). Larger maneuvers followed, invaluable to officers who before had little chance to command large units, but again little multi-echelon training was conducted, partially due to lack of leadership at the lower levels.

Soon after the maneuvers the release of men over the age of 28, those whose one-year term had expired, and those released for other reasons, cost the division 3000 men and many experienced noncommissioned officers. In December of 1941, 7800 replacements were received, followed in January 1942 by another 3200 men (the first from another state). Before moving to Hawaii the division again received some new equipment. Soon after arrival in Hawaii (July 1942) the division was required to adopt the triangular formation that the Regular Army had implemented the year before. This reorganization required a renewed training effort.

While the 27th never had to provide a cadre for another division, it had to provide many NCOs. In addition, in July 1942 most of its senior NCOs were sent to OCS, leaving very few of the original Guard NCOs.

In October the division had to provide 3500 fillers for another division that was sent to Guadalcanal. Meanwhile many officers were still being sent to school and many leaders were transferred or replaced. After much additional training and personnel shuffling, in the Fall of 1943 perhaps one third of the original Guardsmen remained, most

of them privates or junior NCOs. However, at that time most of the senior leadership was still intact (this was soon to change also).

Thus the 27th spent about three years from call up to actual combat. During this time it was used to train new inductees and to provide officers and NCOs for other units. Of about 10,000 original guardsmen, 3,000 were left in the unit when it was sent into combat in August 1943. All these disruptions seriously affected the quality of training in the unit (Kaune, 1990:32-56,165).

Gandy reports of similar experiences for the 41st and 40th Infantry Division. The 41st was mobilized directly from summer training camp on 16 September 1940, while the 40th did not get federalized until March of 1941. In spite of the time difference their, training experiences and problems were similar. Gandy identified problems in three main areas: formal education, manpower replacements, and equipment shortages. Again, the problems he identified are similar to Kaune's findings (1991:17-28).

While the Army was trying to cope with the huge number of new soldiers it needed to train, the Navy and Marine Corps also were busy preparing for war. However, while the Army was trying to train troops following established criteria, the Marine Corps and the Navy first had to develop concepts for a new form of warfare --the amphibious assault.

Krukal quotes General Dwight D. Eisenhower as saying:

an amphibious landing is not a particularly difficult thing.... You put your men in boats and as long as you get well trained crews to take the boats in, it is the simplest deployment in the world --the men can go nowhere else except the beach. (1984:780)

While there undoubtedly is not a single marine that would agree with this statement. Montross quotes General J. F. C. Fuller as calling amphibious combat techniques "in all probability ... the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war" (1960:780).

Following the British failure in Gallipoli in 1915, military planners thought that large amphibious offensives would be doomed by modern firepower. However, a small number of Marine Corps officers still developed the concept and in 1927 the Army and Navy Joint Board assigned the mission of "special preparation in the conduct of landing operations" to the Marine Corps (Montross, 1960:780-781).

A further step was taken when the Fleet Marine Force was created on 8 December 1933, with the responsibility of conducting "the seizure, occupation and defense of naval objectives." (Montross, 1960:781) Since no written guidance was available, the entire population of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia was assigned to write such a directive. What these marines wrote was based on experiences learned in training exercises in previous years (Krukal, 1984:80). Similarly, technical innovations were based on learning from training amphibious assaults.

Since an amphibious assault involves land, sea, and air, traditional land or sea vessels made the transition from water to land difficult; therefore, marines and seaman developed vehicles that could either operate in both or were able to move close enough to land to deposit men and equipment. Marines also convinced the Navy of the usefulness of naval gunfire in amphibious operations. Subsequently the Navy purchased Bloodsworth Island for the sole purpose of amphibious gunfire training (Montross, 1960:782). Later, the Army adopted the marine's manual and sent troops to amphibious training exercises. When amphibious assaults became necessary, the technology was available, and people were trained.

Korean Conflict. When the North Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950, the U.S. was somewhat surprised and unprepared. Reliance on the "nuclear umbrella" had led to the neglect of conventional forces.

Initially American air and naval components were to back the South Korean land army. This decision reflected "a generation of air power theory" (Millis, 1956:292), as well as naval theory, reaching back to Mahan, that proposed "that war could be won by ancillary and indirect weapons without putting one's men on the ground to fight out the issue in the old and bloody way" (Millis, 1956:292). Unfortunately, none of these theories worked against the North Korean army, and nuclear weapons, although considered, were decided

against. Although the Air Force and the Navy were somewhat better prepared than the Army (because the above mentioned theories lent support to their claim for increased appropriations) the task of stemming the tide, man against man, fell again predominantly on the Army.

When General of the Army Douglas MacArthur received authority to employ U.S. ground forces, combat troops in the Eighth Army were 48.8 percent of authorization while service troops were at only 25.9 percent (Gough, 1987:3).

Subsequently, the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps were called and selective service authorization was extended. Due to the quick developments, little time was available to train new people and therefore most of the initial burden of the mobilization fell on experienced World War II veterans, the majority of which were in the inactive reserve. Another reason for calling the inactive reserves first was that the Army wanted to keep active reserves available for any other eventual emergencies. This was contrary to conventional mobility planning, where inactive reserves would have been the last ones to be called. Later, National Guard units were called. These units did some last minute recruiting to gain strength and subsequently required approximately nine months of training (Gough, 1973:28-34).

Selective service created an additional need for training. The Army had reduced the number of training camps

only months before the war, but now these camps were needed again. Unfortunately, equipment was short, and the Regular Army trainers were on their way to Korea as replacements. Because of this lack of trainers, National Guard divisions trained new inductees while Reserve officers organized new training facilities (Gough, 1973:39).

To train replacements the Far East Command set up a training center at Yokohama as well as replacement battalions at Sasebo, Japan and Pusan, Korea. The installations in Japan processed 38,000 replacements between 17 July and 30 September 1950. Seventy percent of these replacements had been flown in by air (Gough, 1973:40-41).

By mid-August General MacArthur requested that reservists be immediately transferred to his command for replacements. This was agreed upon with the condition that reservists receive three weeks of refresher training. However, between processing and the requirements to meet shipping schedules, few reservists saw the full three weeks. To reduce the six months between induction of draftees and completion of training, basic training was reduced from fourteen to six weeks (Gough, 1973:41).

When a rotation system was implemented in April 1951, training became even more important. Since more people needed to be trained, more active troops had to be sent to schools as instructors, reducing available manpower even more.

The Navy, while initially somewhat better prepared, also had training problems. To support the Army, the 1st Marine Division was brought back to life from bits and pieces of the active force as well as recalled reservists, many of them World War II veterans. The Navy itself initially tasked the shore establishment to fill urgent needs in the Far East. Later calls for volunteer reservists were issued. These calls were canceled when involuntary activation was authorized. The Organized Reserve (who conducted weekend and summer training) was the first priority, then the Volunteer Reserve (not paid to perform regular training). This order of recall was not always followed because of specific requirements. Except for aviation components, these reservists were used on an individual basis. Two thousand Fleet Reservists (nominally retired officers and enlisted) were recalled and utilized as instructors. By 1951 almost a quarter of the fleet was comprised of reservists. After that, as selective service provided more manpower, reserve participation declined.

The recall sequence caused some problems with the reactivation of the Reserve Fleet. Activation teams were composed of trained reservists, many of whom had been sent to the Far East. Thus, as the old vessels were prepared for sea duty, the crew had to be trained as well. At the same time, the ships that were needed most, those for amphibious assault, had received the lowest priority for preservation

and had been designated for deterioration. Nevertheless, within less than a year, 564 ships of all types had been taken out of mothballs, transferred to the active fleet, and manned with trained crews (Hodermarsky, 1990:56-61).

Vietnam. Because of the slow build-up of American forces in Vietnam, initial training of basic skills was no problem. Active forces were used; no reserves were called. However, orientation to the new situation of Jungle warfare was lacking. Perret describes the initial orientation:

Troops heading for Southeast Asia got hurried, half-baked instructions based on the successful counterinsurgency campaign the British had mounted in Malaya in the 1950.... The situation in Malaya was so different in its fundamentals that it had little to teach about Vietnam. (1989:504)

After 1967, troops sent to Vietnam were mostly draftees.

Because many legally or illegally avoided the draft:

the average draftee was much less educated, less ambitious, came from a poorer family and was in worse physical condition than the typical young American of the 1960s. Drafting men who were below average was a reversal of conscription policy in the previous wars. (Perret, 1989:530)

There were other problems as well. Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service System assigned high draft priorities to war protesters, thus turning "service in the armed forces from being a duty and a privilege into a punishment" (Perret, 1989:530). Secretary of Defense McNamara, in a social experiment of sorts, insisted that the armed services take 100,000 men a year that fell below service standards. Troops in Vietnam also

were on average eight years younger than the men in World War II, and therefore perhaps less mature. In spite of these problems, race conflicts, and little support from home, the troops fought remarkably well (Perret, 1989:530-531).

However, these problems made the training task harder for the services. Worst of all, from a training standpoint, was the rotation policy, held over from Korea. Perret states that the rotation policy:

short-circuited institutional memory within fighting units. The war was not fought over a ten-year period (1962-72) with a steady growth in wisdom, experience and leadership. Instead, it was broken down into ten miniwars, each lasting a year, with little continuity among them. The moment troops learned to fight effectively and their officers learned how to handle them effectively under fire, they and their company officers were on their way home. (1989:531)

This, of course, meant that training had to be multiplied also. Fortunately, unlike the world wars, there was more time to get ready for the task. However, even the best training in the world could not have corrected all the other problems of this war.

Desert Storm. Unlike Vietnam, this war had focused leadership, decisive action, appropriate strategy, and perhaps the best trained active and reserve forces of any war the U.S. had ever fought in. There was no need to train people from the ground up, only minor refresher and local situation training was necessary. Some combat reserve units required additional training, but in the end the units were

not required. Once in theater, forces had up to six months to prepare for the conflict.

Some training problems were created by the change of previously established plans. While some people had been designated and trained for overseas deployment, frequently these people were not selected to go because of other criteria. The people sent, however, frequently had to be trained before becoming deployable, especially in biochemical defense training.

Conclusion. Because the U.S. generally was ill prepared for war, training was of great importance; however, in the Gulf War, U.S. troops were comparatively well prepared. Perhaps many mistakes could have been avoided, and many lives saved, had mobilization and training of personnel started earlier in previous wars. Unfortunately, through the years, training needs have increased, not only for combatants who use and operate increasingly sophisticated tools of destruction, but also for the men and women who support these combatants. At the same time war has become faster paced, leaving less time for training. The success during the recent Gulf War was a direct dividend from military preparations generated by the Cold War. In different circumstances the length of training to build up a significant force could have made it an operation that would have required years of planning and training. In particular, interservice cooperation was successful because of

interservice cooperation was successful because of previous joint exercises and planning for joint operations.

Perhaps, due the expeditionary nature of all the discussed wars, military funding, and thus recruiting and training, always lagged behind the political conviction to go to war. This conviction usually took some time to develop, but when the Nation was finally ready, the Army, and to some extent the other services, were still trying to recover from a peacetime budget.

Chapter Summary

Manpower mobilization has been of great concern to U.S. military leaders throughout the last 100 years. Their concern was based on the fact that the Nation, except during the Cold War, allowed for only a limited peacetime military establishment. During each of the six wars studied, political and military leaders apparently were able to initially gain broad public support for each war and the available manpower policies, including conscription.

Thus conscription, a concept which many considered "un-American," was introduced slowly. Conscription had been tried with limited success during the Civil War. Although not used during the Spanish-American War, it was indispensable during the First World War. There the draft gained broader support because of its decentralized administration; however, it was not implemented until after the declaration of war. For World War II, conscription was

started on a limited scale during peacetime. By the time of the Korean and Vietnam wars, the draft had been institutionalized, but, because of the limited manpower needs and the resulting questionable deferment policies, eventually ran into trouble and was discontinued. The draft as a military manpower procurement tool continues on, dormant, in the Selective Service System, to be activated only in the case of a total mobilization.

Volunteerism, as opposed to the draft, was always seen as the manpower supply tool of a democratic state. While it represented American individualism, it often created problems for a military force that for success depended not as much on individual action as on concerted group effort. Volunteerism was sufficient for smaller conflicts and usually was the means of manpower procurement during periods of peace. This trend was only broken during the Cold War. Since 1973, the U.S. has depended again on an all-volunteer military system.

The mobilization question properly should not be exclusively limited to volunteerism or conscription, but a combination of both. Generally, today's all-volunteer force supplies enough personnel to fill most military manpower requirements. However, if world events again require more forces than are available, conscription will be needed again. Emphasis needs to be placed on refining previous

faults of the Selective Service System before the U.S. has to use it again.

Another trend is the reliance, in peacetime, on reserve forces rather than a large standing force. Early on, the states laid claim to these reserve forces in order to avoid too much power in the hands of the central government. That the central government eventually was able to gain more control will be summarized later. If reserve forces are well trained and equipped, reliance on these forces is justifiable; however, over much of the early part of the studied period, these reserve forces were strong only on paper. Frequently, such as during the Spanish-American War, these forces served as pools of partially trained manpower to draw volunteers from. Only in the latter half of this century, perhaps because of the Cold War, did reserve forces get most of the training and equipment they needed. The reserve forces' status and support was further enhanced by the dependence of the active forces on them as envisioned in the Total Force policy.

Due to small peacetime forces and either prolonged public discussions or relative secrecy before the entry into most wars, manpower procurement usually got off to a slow start. Thus military manpower requirements had to compete with industrial manpower requirements which were, in turn, compounded by military needs. Frequently, industrial and manpower mobilization were not synchronized. Thus, either

men had to train without weapons, as often happened in the Army, or the weapons were available, but crews were inadequately trained, as occasionally happened on naval vessels taken out of storage.

Planning for mobilization became increasingly necessary and sophisticated. However, prepared plans were usually not followed, either because the situation had changed or the plans were simply disregarded. Nonetheless, once planning had become an established activity, it did much to foster preparedness.

As mentioned earlier, throughout the studied time period federal control of available manpower increased. While the federal government during the Spanish-American War had little control over the National Guard, and had done little to equip state forces, by the time of Desert Storm, Reserve and Guard forces were well integrated, trained, and equipped with compatible equipment.

A similar trend can be seen within the services, where increasing cooperation and unification can be found. During the Spanish-American War the Army and Navy each fought their own separate wars. In World War I the services still had trouble integrating operations. By World War II, European theater forces were well integrated, but MacArthur and Nimitz fought largely separate wars in the Pacific, each in the name of his service, but using some of the other's forces. Likewise, the Air Force pursued its own grand

objectives, sometimes to the detriment of ground support for the land forces. To improve cooperation, the services were united under the Department of Defense after World War II. Recently, Desert Storm, while still plagued by some problems in cooperation, was lauded as a model of unification of effort, a direct result of decades of work toward better service cooperation.

It has to be pointed out, however, that independent of whether the organizational structure fosters cooperation or not, cooperation results from training. Training starts out with the individual, then the small unit, followed by training of increasingly larger echelons, and finally reaches the level of service cooperation. The better trained a force is, the higher the level of cooperation. If not learned in training, then in war servicemembers learn very quickly how much they depend on each other. To learn by doing, however, is always costly. Some critics point out that there is too much duplication in the military, that the Navy has its own army (the Marines) and air force, the Army has its own small air force, and other similar claims. While some of this duplication may have resulted from the realization that in war it is dangerous to rely on only one approach, part of this development may have been a result of the services' attempts to be self-sufficient, rather than concentrating on interservice cooperation alone.

Overall, although much could have been done better, military manpower procurement was successful. Every war studied had a sufficient manpower pool available to do what was necessary. Even during the Vietnam War, given all the controversies surrounding the rotation policy, the armed forces suffered less from training problems than from other factors. While the U.S. is often known more for her ability to activate an "arsenal of democracy" than for the fighting spirit of its people, this fighting spirit, often demonstrated in individual actions, has made her the strongest nation on earth.

IV. Demobilizations

Political Background and Policy

Introduction. Demobilization is the process of reducing the military forces from war-time to peace-time manning levels. In the last hundred years the military has continued to improve upon demobilization processes after each successive conflict. Up until the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, demobilization consisted of units being disbanded after the cessation of hostilities. Sparrow, in his book History of Personnel Demobilization In The United States Army, notes that through the Spanish-American War demobilizations had minimal economic impact on personnel being discharged from the services, and on U.S. Industry, for opportunities existed due to the nation's continuing economic and territorial expansion. While the U.S. territorial expansion had ended by the Spanish-American War, the war ended so quickly that little strain was placed upon the manpower and industrial resources of the country (1952:8-12). Those who had volunteered for the Spanish-American War were easily reassimilated into the U.S. economy.

Post Spanish-American War. When the United States and Spain discontinued fighting, demobilization planning started. And, just as in earlier wars, the public wanted the troops returned home and released from service immediately. Initially troops were to be processed at

Federal camps, then moved to their state camp and subsequently released. However, to get troops home quicker, the administrative processing was relocated to state camps, and while paperwork was being processed, troops were furloughed for thirty to sixty days. Troops had to return to the state camps after the furlough to be discharged, and this made obtaining permanent employment difficult. From the Spanish-American demobilization, the military realized that administrative procedures should be conducted while units were still under Federal control so as to streamline the process to quickly discharge troops (Sparrow, 1952:10).

Post World War I. World War I was the first war in which the majority of the troops were conscripts, the first war where men were enlisted for the duration of the emergency, and the first war where the economic impact of demobilization was given consideration. When the war ended on 11 November 1918, over three million conscripts were eligible for release from service. Plans for economic postwar demobilization started in May 1918 from the suggestion of the Secretary of the Council of National Defense. U.S. Allies and the Germans had already begun postwar planning in 1917 (Howenstine, 1944:78-79). Although manpower demobilization plans were begun in October 1918 (Sparrow, 1952:11), no plan was ever made to coordinate the needs of industrial and manpower demobilization. Howenstine states several reasons why no central control was placed

over demobilization planning to ensure integration: (1) until the signing of the Armistice any planning not connected to the prosecution of the war and defeat of Germany was looked upon as being unpatriotic; (2) no one realized the impact that transitioning from war to peace would have; (3) many felt that no planning was necessary and that the best policy was to return to pre-war days as quickly as possible; (4) the war ended much quicker than the spring of 1919 projections; (5) the nature of the nation as a whole to wait until an actual crisis loomed and then hastily find an expedient solution; and (6) groups advocating a planned demobilization had conflicting interests, therefore, planned demobilization was blocked by special interest groups (1944:87-90).

Unable to find a solution to economic demobilization and reconstruction, President Wilson by default pursued a laissez-faire policy (Howenstine, 1944:92-93). Taking into account the welfare of the nation as well as that of military personnel, the military demobilization planners had developed four different demobilization concepts: separation by length of service; by occupation or industry needs; by local draft board; or by military unit. Without specific guidance the military was able to choose demobilization based on military considerations and chose to demobilize personnel by military unit. Unit demobilization allowed the military to release units no longer needed and

maintain efficiency of retained units. Economic planners favored demobilization by occupation, which was done for a few key industries such as coal mining and railroads, but for the most part men were released by unit (Howenstine, 1944: 130-131).

As economic planners feared, large scale release by unit did cause the United States to have a labor surplus and the economy suffered a slight depression in 1920 through 1922. Yet, the United States demobilization and post war recovery compared favorably with European recovery where major preparations had been made for economic demobilization during the war. (Howenstine, 1944:134-136, 297; Sparrow, 1952:13).

U.S. Servicemen, their families, and Congress were already complaining about the slowness of demobilization as early as mid January 1919. Demobilization was occurring as fast as possible given the fact the United States did not have enough transport ships to bring all the troops home immediately. In fact, British and French ships had transported seventy-five percent of U.S. troops over to France after the U.S. entered the war. Some members of Congress, most notably Senator James A. Reed, felt that the U.S. should demand Britain and France to supply ships to bring our soldiers home immediately, even though Britain and France were using the ships to transport their own troops home from colonial areas (Howenstine, 1944:132-133).

Post World War II. During the interwar period between World War I and World War II, mobilization plans were formulated, but no thought was given to demobilization plans until January 1942. On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt told Congress that he tasked the National Resources Planning Board to develop postwar plans covering employment and the rebuilding of America (Sparrow, 1952:24-25). As a result, serious personnel demobilization planning by the War Department began in June 1942. Early planning debated whether to demobilize on an individual or unit basis. During previous wars, unit demobilization was most often used by the United States. Reasons for debate over individual versus unit release were not based on the economic considerations discussed in World War I, but on fairness to troops. In short wars unit demobilization has the advantage, but in a long war such as World War II, unit demobilization has several disadvantages.

The disadvantages to unit demobilization dealt with troop issues. Initially, units were identifiable as regular, national guard, or of the Army of the United States (predecessor to Reserves); but over time units lost their identity. After initial unit mobilizations, most follow-on troops in World War II were mobilized as individuals to replace losses and to form new units. As a result, units consisted of personnel with a variety of experience--long and short. Additionally, planners realized the probable

need for occupation forces after the war and saw the unfairness of demobilizing one division while sending another to occupation duty (Sparrow, 1952:287).

Individual demobilization was finally decided as the best method to use for World War II, and the War Department issued a public statement outlining its redeployment and demobilization policies in September 1944. Demobilization was to be based on four factors: length of service, length of service overseas, combat record, and number of dependents. Public reception of the plan was favorable. (Sparrow, 1952:103).

However, when the plan was implemented after victory in Europe (V-E day), criticism of both the point system used in the plan and the plan's fairness began. After the defeat of Japan, public criticism mounted. Troops felt they were not being released fast enough, family members formed associations calling for troop release, and Congressmen received letters from both groups warning them to speed up the demobilization process or risk political suicide in the next election (Sparrow, 1952:141-170).

The Services, especially the Army, were pressured to speed up demobilization. By January 1946, over five million men had been released from the Army, and the War Department feared that the nation would run out of Army troops to meet its international commitments (Anastas, 1983: 26-27). Required post-war strengths were finally approved by

Congress at slightly over one million men for the Army, slightly less than five hundred thousand for the Navy, and slightly less than one hundred thousand for the Marines (Matloff, 1973:531). These troop levels were reached within one year of Japan's defeat, and were significantly higher than pre-war levels.

Besides the demobilization of troops, government-owned industrial facilities created during the war were also demobilized. Most were sold to private enterprise for as little as fifteen cents on the dollar and those not sold were allowed to deteriorate (Clem, 1983:52-53). Serviceable supplies and equipment were not maintained and placed in war reserves as manpower and industrial facilities were reduced (Sparrow, 1952:291).

Such industrial and economic demobilization represents a new dimension not significantly encountered in the past. In previous wars, most industrial production, except munitions, was converted to civilian uses. While this practice held true for the large aircraft industry, it did not hold true for fighter plane, tank, or armored vehicle production industries. Now, for the first time, conscious decisions would be needed in deciding what war production facilities needed to be maintained.

Post Korean Conflict. World II was the last major personnel demobilization in U.S. history. By contrast, Korea only demobilized the reserve and national guard

personnel that had been called to active duty (Heymont and McGregor, 1972: 3-10, 4-1). The trend of post-war personnel strengths being larger than pre-war strengths was continued, in part because by the United States was committed to communist containment (Matloff, 1973: 572). In order to maintain the industrial capability after the Korean War, and still be ready for the potential future war with the Soviet Union, the President enacted the Defense Mobilization Order on 25 August 1954, an order that required maintenance of the industrial mobilization base. For the first time in United States history, policy required peacetime preparedness (Clem, 1983: 66-67).

Post Vietnam War. With the exception of the brief mention given during the Korean War, new demobilization procedures, policy, and planning were almost nonexistent after World War II. Compared to the volumes of information available about demobilization after World War I and II, relatively little information is available about demobilization after Vietnam, perhaps because it was not a declared national conflict. However, there was a release of personnel. Reserve personnel were released from active duty, the draft was stopped and replaced by the all volunteer services, and there was a reduction in force of officer ranks. The end result was that for the first time since the Spanish-American War, post-war active duty military strength was smaller than pre-war strength.

Industrial demobilization never occurred for Vietnam. Military procurement had never been given a higher priority than civilian industrial needs, thus there had been little conversion of civilian related industry to defense industry. (Clem, 1983; Merritt and Carter 1985).

Post Desert Storm. Desert Storm saw the first mobilization of all-volunteer forces since the Spanish-American War. Demobilization was similar to the Korean War in that only the National Guard, Reserves, and those active duty personnel kept from leaving service during the conflict were released. The pre-war and post-war active duty military force remained constant.

Conclusion. From 1898 to 1991 demobilization efforts have seen a variety of conditions. Until the end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam in 1973, the services' post-war personnel levels were always higher than pre-war levels (see Appendix A).

Manpower demobilization planning since World War II has consisted primarily of unit demobilization of National Guard and Reserve units with some individual releases of draftees after Vietnam. As noted by Sparrow, unit demobilization is most efficient and desirable for short wars (1952:287). Vietnam and Korea were not short wars, but the rotation policies made the time in theater relatively brief for draftees and reservists. The United States has effectively

demonstrated the ability to handle limited war manpower demobilizations for both conscript and volunteer forces.

Large scale demobilization has not been done in forty-five years. In 1952, Sparrow wrote that for every mobilization plan there should be a demobilization plan (287). While mobilization plans such as the Army's FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORSCOM Regulation 500-3) describe reserve mobilization, there is no mention of demobilization. If the United States has to do a large scale mobilization of conscripts again, demobilization planning should begin as the conscripts are inducted. However, earlier demobilization planning may be difficult, because the world situation has changed so rapidly in the last few years that deciding on a large scale demobilization process prior to any war may be inappropriate. The same thought applies to industrial base demobilization, especially since there is no consensus on how the industrial base needs to be currently maintained. When needed, this planning should be conducted by the Department of Defense and monitored by Congress so that the demobilization plan does not require large-scale modification by Congress during implementation.

Military Manpower Procurement

Introduction. After every war, military and political leaders attempted to incorporate the lessons they had learned about the procurement of military manpower into new

legislation, policies, and procedures. These changes, they hoped, would avoid past errors and make mobilization for the next war more efficient.

The Spanish-American War presented a turning point in the methods of raising and controlling military manpower. It not only was the first war to be fought off the North American Continent; it also showed that the traditional small standing army, backed by a large state-controlled militia, had some drawbacks. While the militia was a good source of partly trained volunteers, militia units usually were ill equipped to fight, nor were they obligated to fight outside the country.

To correct these deficiencies reformers advanced different theories. Some wanted a large standing army, others still saw a role for the National Guard. The compromises achieved resulted in a larger standing army after each war, assisted by the National Guard and other reserve components that ultimately became more standardized and under increased federal control.

Post Spanish-American War. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War during the Spanish-American War, was held responsible by many for the Army's so-called "mismanagement" of the war, "a war with which it [the Army] had never been organized or equipped to deal" (Millis, 1956:155). Although perhaps unmerited, Alger was replaced by Elihu Root. President McKinley had chosen Root, a lawyer who was unfamiliar with

anything related to the Army, to administer the new territorial conquests in the Philippines and the Caribbean. But Root found that in order to effectively administer the new territories he would first have to reform the organization he had available for colonial governance--the Army (Millis, 1956:155).

Most of the volunteers of the war had been sent home by the end of 1898, following the end of their enlistment. But the new colonial responsibilities required a larger military force and so did the new coastal fortifications that had been built. Therefore, in March of 1899, McKinley received authorization from Congress to temporarily raise the Regular Army to 65,000 and to add an additional 35,000 federal volunteers (Millis, 1956:156).

When Root arrived he had to fight the old Army bureaucracy to get capable officers to lead the volunteers (the Army desired to stay with its seniority system). He felt the old military establishment no longer could provide for the protection of the country.

Millis reports of four things Root felt necessary to prepare for war:

a staff organization capable of studying the larger problems of military service and making a systematic preparation of war plans; a similar agency capable of evaluating new weapons systems, materials and military inventions and of recommending on their adoption; an adequate process for selecting officers for appointment and promotion, and an exercise and training system that would drill officers and men in "the movement of large bodies of troops." In addition,

something would have to be done to insure a supply of trained men to reinforce the regular establishment in time of need--in short, to establish a reserve system. (1956:157-158)

The Dick Act of 1903 embodied many of Root's ideas but fell short of his intentions as far as control over the reserves was concerned.

The Navy, expanding before the war, and having performed well, continued its expansion program. When President Roosevelt, the Navy's biggest sponsor, left office, the Navy had grown from five battleships and two armored cruisers to 25 battleships and ten heavy cruisers. Unfortunately, by the time these ships were built they were largely obsolete, but kept sailors employed, trained, and ready (Millis, 1956:156-166).

Post World War I. Following the war, Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, thought the time was right for universal conscription, or universal military training (UMT), as some called it. He envisioned, as a minimum, one field army of five corps as a regular force to ward off any enemy that might consider setting foot on American soil. His view was the natural progression of reforms military leaders had sought following the Spanish-American War. However, he had not considered the mood of the Nation, which was unfavorable toward a "large and expensive combat-ready military structure" (Millis, 1956:216-217).

Not only civilians felt that way. Besides the mad rush of draftees to return home, Congress in 1920 noted that

since the end of the war, 2,452 had resigned from the army and 11,083 had deserted. The Military Academy at "West Point had about 50 per cent vacancies, the greatest in its history" (Millis, 1956:217).

Finally, the National Defense Act of 1920 was enacted after much debate between UMT advocates and those who wanted to return to a small, cheap pre-war army. Griffith reports:

The act increased the peacetime strength of the regular army from a maximum of 175,000 to 280,000 enlisted men. The troops were organized into a fully operational force, not an expandable army according to Uptonian principles, and given specific missions. The regular army retained sole responsibility for overseas areas such as the Philippines. Regulars in the United States were organized into combat divisions, which could quickly serve as emergency force. The National Guard, which regained some autonomy, and the Reserve Corps, established in 1916, were also organized into divisions. ...the regular army, was to assist in the training of the civilian components in each of nine new geographically ordered corps areas. (Griffith, 1982:22)

Each of the corps area was to include one regular, three National Guard, and two Organized Reserve divisions (Millis, 1956:217). Unfortunately, the Selective Service Act of 1917 had only required men drafted after April 1917 to serve for the duration of the war plus four months (Griffith, 1982:9). Thus, these men had no reserve obligation, and not enough of them, or any other group, volunteered to fill the ranks of the reserve components.

By 1927, the Regular Army had been cut to less than 119,000. The National Guard divisions seldom reached even

half strength, and in the absence of federal drill pay could not be required to train (although some volunteered for what little training was available). The result? "Within two or three years the military structure had become almost useless even as a mobilization base" (Millis, 1956:218).

The Navy perhaps was no better off than the Army. Following the war, after building over 300 destroyers authorized under wartime programs, the Navy realized it never had built twelve of the 50 destroyers authorized in 1916. Promptly it started building those, although the circumstances present for the authorization had drastically changed. The war had left only one navy stronger, the British, and the General Board of the U.S. Navy hoped to surpass or at least equal it. To do so the General Board envisioned another three year building program, a plan that was ultimately defeated. Several international conferences were to limit naval strength until 1935, and authorizations often did not even allow for building up to treaty limits (Millis, 1956:214-215, 218-222).

Post World War II. Even as the services worked furiously to get men out (because of the demand of the public and Congress) they had some concern about manning the regular forces after the war. For example, the Navy anticipated a serious shortage of experienced officers and critical skills in the enlisted ratings. Secretary of The Navy James Forrestal actually sent an open letter to reserve

officers to ask them to consider a career in the regular Navy (Hodermarsky, 1990:19).

Military and political leaders, as had occurred after the First World War, attempted again to institute universal military training (the training of all young men in some military skills), but were unable to persuade the public or Congress (Griffith, 1988: 26-27). Millis hypothesizes that the secondary intent of teaching moral and spiritual values was "one of the worst troubles about the whole proposal" (1956:276), and that young Americans, while willing to train for a real military need, would not be enthusiastic about training that primarily served moral and civic purposes.

Other developments also influenced the services and caused considerable confusion. The Army Air Force, soon to become its own service, was planning on a minimum of seventy air groups. This force was to include 630 bombers (21 groups), even though the United States Strategic Bombing Survey had shown that conventional weapons had had little effect on Germany until the number of bombers reached 5,000 (British and American). The fate of atomic bombs, however, was in the hands of civilian agencies. Further, the intent after the war was that the atomic capability was to be neutralized or abolished. But this was only part of the post-war confusion. As Millis states:

While the Truman administration maintained minimum Army and Marine occupation forces in the many troubled areas abroad, the basic military structure was liquidated in the tides of

demobilization. The uncoordinated plans of the three services made little sense, and it was becoming more and more obvious that nothing could be done to meet the military problem until the whole system could be revised. Superficially, at least, it seemed in a completely anomalous state. In addition to its gunnery ships, the Navy had its own aviation, its own army (the Marines) and even its own peculiar kind of army aviation in the Marine air squadrons. The Army, on the other hand, while possessing a small naval transport and landing equipage, had no aviation of its own at all; for air support it was wholly dependent on the Army Air Force, which admitted only a distant responsibility to the General Staff and was primarily committed to its doctrine of independent air power. (1956:279)

Since integrating multiservice forces under one commander in the field had worked well, many top commanders, tired of interservice rivalries at home, advocated a single service. This was not to be; instead the Air Force was separated from the Army and all services were brought under one Secretary of Defense in 1947 (Millis, 1956:278-280).

As before, the Nation had returned to voluntary service in the military after the war. This time there only was a 15 month period without draft legislation because many thought legislation for universal military training would be forthcoming. No such legislation could be agreed upon, and by 1948 the wartime force of 13,000,000 had shrunk to 1,374,000 (Millis, 1956:283). The shrinking of the forces could not be stopped with volunteers alone, thus draft legislation was passed again. It was designed to be a temporary measure until UMT could be instituted, but since

the legislation brought manpower up to desired levels it also quelled any further chance for UMT.

Post Korean Conflict. The Korean crisis had come as a surprise to the U.S., but perhaps even more surprising was the fact that neither the threat of nuclear weapons nor air and naval power could stop the North Koreans. Ground troops, thought of by some as an antiquated remnant of old wars, were again necessary. In 1948, there had been 631,000. Of these ground troops, 253,000 were written off as "political" forces, since they were on occupation duty in Europe and the Far East. They were not included in military planning and received little training (Millis, 1956:283). But these troops were the first to be thrown into battle. Next, World War II veterans were called because not enough trained reservists were available.

All in all, this old-fashioned war (the Nation's third largest), which was not even called a war, caused much bewilderment, and started the machinery of mobilization. Initially, little of the activity benefited the men in Korea, who fought largely with World War II weapons. But the amazing technical developments in the Soviet Union (such as the recent atomic test) shifted emphasis once again from men to machines.

After the war, demobilization was very limited, only Reservists and Guardsmen were sent home because of the Cold War threat, while the standing forces were maintained and

expanded. The draft effectively enabled the services to do two things: depress enlisted pay (for pay statistics see Appendix A) and simultaneously fill manpower requirements (Griffith, 1988:29). The draft also helped to bring in volunteers who in part were motivated by the fact that volunteering gave them some say in their future assignment.

Post Vietnam. After Korea, emphasis had again been shifted to technical development of weapons to prepare for the struggle with the Soviet Union, but the Vietnam war was to distract attention from the technological race. Men again became more important than machines, because nuclear weapons had not presented enough of a threat to stop Viet Cong aggression and were again found undesirable for combat. Vietnam became another conventional war. This time few reservists were called upon and the draft soon encountered public opposition. Draft opposition ultimately led President Nixon to abolish the draft and institute all-volunteer armed forces.

Perret states that Congress, shortly before the end of the war and in preparation for the all-volunteer force, doubled the pay of enlisted men and tripled recruiting budgets (1989:537). Previously, pay had been low but the draft was seen as an enlistment incentive, since volunteers were given more choices as to which service, career field, or even location they wanted to go to. In order to attract men to combat specialties, some bonuses of three thousand

dollars were offered. Furthermore, many military career fields were opened to women. Perret continues:

Traditional irritants and disincentives were abolished, such as reveille, short hair, bed checks and Saturday inspections. Beer-vending machines were installed in the barracks. A five-day workweek was established, despite the obvious risks to combat readiness in places such as Germany and Korea. The military justice system was overhauled to make it more open and less arbitrary. (1989:537-538)

All these actions made it easier to recruit people, but also contributed to a serious lowering of standards. Leadership was replaced with management. Perret further points out that "for a decade or so following the withdrawal from Vietnam all the services were troubled by poor morale, drug abuse and deteriorating discipline" (1989:538).

Griffith disagrees with Perret, and states that "growing undiscipline, drug abuse, racial incidents, and malfeasance" helped convince General Westmoreland that a volunteer force could be useful because "professional standards could be reestablished, and dissidents, malcontents, and misfits weeded out" (1988:34). It is unclear, then, whether poor morale and discipline was a result of relaxed standards in the early all-volunteer force or if discipline problems were merely a carryover from involuntary conscription and poor leadership.

Post Desert Storm. While a demobilization of active forces from Cold War levels is ongoing, Congress and DoD strive to avoid the mistakes of earlier demobilizations by

mandating a certain level of recruiting to avoid age group "holes" in future forces. This policy often raises questions by those less familiar with military needs, why the Services still spend money to recruit and train people while they are downsizing. At the same time, midcareer military personnel are asking why they may be asked to leave while recruiting efforts are still ongoing.

Millis reported that in 1917 "The Army was still widely scattered in the small posts which local politics had insisted on preserving, long after their military utility had passed" (1956:178). Little has changed since then in terms of political attitude. Today many state politicians still take an interest in "their" active and reserve military installations since local interest and economy are at stake. Matthews reports:

The Pentagon's plan to eliminate reserve forces during the defense drawdown collided with hometown politics as senators vowed to fight any cuts to the National Guard, particularly in their home states. (1992a:10)

Matthews also shows the justification of the Department of Defense, which contends that if an active unit is deactivated, its supporting reserve units are also no longer needed (1992b:35). Thus, the discussion over the balance between active and reserve forces is still ongoing.

Desert Storm did show the Total Force to be a valid concept, and many reserve units made outstanding contributions to the war.

Conclusion. After every war military leaders attempted to correct what they perceived as problems with the raising of military manpower before and during war. While they achieved some gains, their schemes were tempered by political realities and the loss of public interest in military matters following each war.

While the size of standing forces after every war never achieved the size military leaders had envisioned, the size of the forces did increase over pre-war levels after every war except Vietnam and Desert Storm (see Appendix A). Furthermore, after every war the National Guard came under increasing federal control to raise the level of training and equipment, which in turn made it a more reliable part of the defense establishment. The increase in federal control also caused Guard, Reserve, and regular forces to become very similar; however, Guard forces are still under state control during peace time.

Military Manpower Reductions

Introduction. After every war the American public desired the quick return of family members from military service, and service members often went through great efforts to gain release. This was even more pronounced when the service member was conscripted. Of all the wars discussed, only the World Wars and the Gulf War did not have a rotation policy.

After the World Wars the services gave in to political pressure to quickly release a majority of its service men, and suffered in the resulting chaos as the military might that had been built with great pains dissolved.

The drawdown after Korea and Vietnam was less pronounced because of the Cold War but military effectiveness nevertheless suffered because military planners after each of these wars went back to plan for the potential nuclear war in Europe.

After the war in the Persian Gulf, reserve component members quickly returned to their private lives while active members were faced with the post Cold War drawdown. The services are making great efforts to retain military effectiveness in the face of great budget reductions.

Post Spanish-American War. After the war all volunteers serving in Cuba were released, but not until hundreds of them died of diseases in mismanaged recuperation camps (Severo and Milford, 1989:189-210). Those employed in the Philippines were retained, many volunteers staying beyond their term of enlistment to wait for regular replacements. The Regular Army and the Marine Corps remained occupied with the pacification of the Philippines and the occupation of other territories taken over from Spain. The Navy, having performed well in Cuba as well as in the Philippines, and given the support of President Roosevelt, was able to expand.

Post World War I. World War I was fought "to make the world safe for democracy" and many people thought that this would be the war to end all wars. Military planners had worked hard to win the war and had given little thought to post-war military requirements. Mock and Thurber point out that even less thought was given to demobilization with thousands of soldiers, sailors, and marines released into a shrinking economy (1944:126-144). After the conclusion of hostilities, most of the volunteers and conscripts were released with \$60 of mustering-out pay and a cash travel allowance. Although 300,000 men had been wounded, only 47,000 claims for combat injuries were allowed, partly because many servicemen, in their haste to return home, signed affidavits that confirmed their health and in effect released the U.S. government from any monetary obligation to pay them for injuries sustained during the war (Mock and Thurber, 1944:139).

Since most civilians had made good money in war industries, eventually veterans came to think that they deserved more for their sacrifices. However, the same people that had made fortunes during the war did not want to "cheapen" the patriotism of the former soldiers since these civilians felt to be allowed to fight for the freedom of one's country was its own reward. Thus, little help was provided for veterans. The Great Depression made things even worse for veterans and it is unfortunate that in 1932

regular Army troops would drive veterans, estimated between 25,000 and 40,000, out of Washington with rifles, bayonets, machineguns, tanks, and cavalry. These veterans, called the "bonus marchers," had come to Washington, many with their families, to lobby for financial assistance (Severo and Milford, 1989:258-275). Severo and Milford further report that one of the veterans roused by the cavalry commanded by Major George S. Patton, Joe Angelo, "was credited with having saved his [Patton's] life during the war" (1989:274).

Although General Douglas MacArthur presumably sent these troops to break up the demonstrators based on the direction of his superiors, incidents like these did little to gain more support for the Regular Army.

But not only the discharged veterans suffered. Following the war, the Army staff had hoped for a 500,000-man standing army (Griffith, 1988:23); however, legislation only would provide for 280,000 (Spector, 1988:71), while funding would cut this number even further. Budget reductions were largely due to growing isolationism, the movement to run the government more economically, and the still present American distrust of a large standing army. Thus the great war machine of the First World War, in little time, was reduced to a fraction of its size and effectiveness. Spector points out that perhaps the Army after the war was less prepared than at any time in its previous history (1988:70).

Like the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps also wanted to reduce their forces quickly. Unlike the Army, however, Navy reductions took place primarily on an individual basis. By May 1919, the Marine Corps discovered that it had reduced too rapidly. Policing duties in the Caribbean and support of naval forces required a drastic curtailment of separations (Mock and Thurber, 1944:137-138).

Post World War II. Peppers stated that after World War II "Our hasty demobilization actions bled our military of most of its capability" (1988:151) and:

The discharge of close to 9 million men, almost overnight it seems, left the services with many chiefs and few Indians. Most of those who remained in service in late 1945 and early 1946 were officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Military capability suffered. These higher-ranking people were forced by circumstances to perform jobs they were not qualified to perform. (1988:151)

Peppers further reported that only the Navy had capabilities for limited military action (1988:151), a view not shared by Hodermarsky who stated that "By October 1946 when the personnel cutbacks were completed, the U.S. Navy was not capable of reacting to even a limited crisis" (1990:23).

Another problem was the method of personnel reduction. Release and discharge was based on a point system calculated for each individual. The point system considered months in service and overseas, number of battle/campaign stars, combat decorations, and number of children. What it did not consider was service needs. Thus, units virtually

disintegrated when more and more individuals departed, a condition that became progressively worse because the point minimum required for release was reduced constantly. Plans for orderly property return shipments or disposal also had to be scrapped because not enough people were left to carry them out. In addition, supply and maintenance forces were still needed but were unable to perform essential duties because of lack of personnel. Peppers reported of \$50 billion in surplus supplies and equipment overseas in August 1945. Not surprisingly, much of this equipment was lost or destroyed due to the chaos created by demobilization. Peppers also stated that: "Mission capability of the world's mightiest military force came suddenly to an end!" (1988:146).

Hodermarsky reported of similar problems in the Navy, although such problems were exasperated by the fact that it was the Navy who had to ship the majority of the separating individuals of all services home. The Navy's point system was somewhat different from the Army's, but like the Army's was severely criticized by those not having the required amount of points. Also, like the Army's point system, the Navy's did not consider mission needs (1990:16-17).

Hodermarsky pointed out that demobilization by unit, although more efficient, was not politically acceptable. Many commanding officers had difficulties performing their mission under this release system and were authorized to

delay discharges up to 120 days based on military need. Some enlisted and officer ratings were exempt from discharge altogether and discharge policy was revised depending on requirements. At the same time an acute shortage of experienced officers and certain critical enlisted skills was anticipated prompting Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to send an open letter to reserve officers urging them to contemplate a career in the Navy. Uncertainty about future personnel needs of the Navy also made planning difficult and "personnel instability existed through much of the postwar period" (1990:17-20). Because of the rapid release of personnel, efforts to properly "mothball" vessels were delayed and sometimes inadequate (Hodermarsky, 1990:20-22).

Post Korean Conflict. After the conflict, only reservists and guardsmen were released; regular troops were largely maintained to counter the communist threat, while the Cold War intensified. Draft legislation was extended, and although few were drafted, it induced many to volunteer. While after previous wars conscription was always discontinued, after the Korean War, the draft was continued, with little opposition, because of the escalation of the Cold War (Griffith, 1988:29).

Although the war had demonstrated that conventional wars, requiring hand-to-hand combat, were still possible, emphasis shifted to reliance on strategic nuclear forces to

deter aggression. Military manpower levels were allowed to drop from 3.5 million in 1953 to 2.5 million in 1961. While in 1954 some 58 percent of the men entering the Army were draftees, by 1961 the number of inductees had been reduced to 22 percent (Griffith, 1988:29).

Post Vietnam. After the completion of a combat tour most men were ready to return home. However, by the end of the war larger reductions were necessary, requiring involuntary reduction-in-force measures in the career force. After these reductions, some officers elected to continue to serve though reduced to an enlisted grade, while others faced very slow promotion prospects or worse yet, demotion.

Post Desert Storm. After the war, all Guard and Reserve units were released. Programmed reductions in active forces, some of which were temporarily halted during the war, were also continued. Much emphasis was placed on maintaining an rank balanced force by cutting back in all ranks. Legislation was passed to provide for exit bonuses for enlisted as well as officers to encourage voluntary separations. Other cutbacks were made through reduction in accessions, reduction in reenlistments, more restrictive maximum service limits for particular ranks, selective early retirement boards, early release programs, and reduction in force boards.

Although all services maintain an active recruitment program to keep the forces from becoming top heavy, some

military analysts see this period of reductions as a good time to re-establish some of the historical differences between junior and senior enlisted pay. These differences had been eroded by the pay raises in the 1970s to attract people to the services. Willis cites a Rand study that recommends a pay cut of at least ten percent for new recruits. Rand analysts feel the money saved could be used more effectively in other incentive programs, and argue that under current market conditions even a lower pay rate would attract sufficient volunteers to the services (1992:4).

All services are attempting to maintain their integrity while consolidating and shrinking. As in previous demobilization periods, funding of the services will determine in large part how effective the reduced forces will be.

Conclusion. Following most American wars the general public and their elected representatives gave little thought to post-war military effectiveness, primarily because no immediate threat was perceived, except during the Cold War. Thus, the powerful forces built up during World War I and II were dismantled in little time and later had to be rebuilt with great difficulty.

Forces after Korea and Vietnam were less drastically reduced, however, because of the imagined deterrent provided by the so-called "nuclear umbrella." Because of the

decreased emphasis on conventional forces, some loss of effectiveness was encountered even after these two wars.

After the war in the Gulf, the Cold War was over as well, and military reductions were continued. How much effectiveness the services will be able to preserve under reduced appropriations remains to be seen.

Chapter Summary

By its very nature, demobilization is of secondary concern during war. A war first has to be finished before one can implement demobilization plans. But when the end is in sight, it is frequently too late to effectively plan for manpower demobilization. Only during limited involvements such as Korea, Vietnam, and, more recently, Desert Storm, were manpower reductions thoroughly planned and carried out. But after large scale mobilizations such as World War I and II, with their large conscript forces, domestic concerns quickly overpowered military plans to reduce manpower levels.

Hodermarsky, in his study of the impact of naval force reductions between 1945 and 1950, said that "On a relative basis, during demobilization reducing personnel levels is easy; reducing materiel assets is hard" (1991:66). Our research demonstrated similar results but the statement has to be qualified. While it may have been easy to reduce manpower, it was always difficult to reduce manpower while maintaining an effective military establishment. In part,

this difficulty was a result of the turbulence created by the manpower reductions. The problem of reducing materiel assets was to a significant degree a manpower problem also, and stemmed from the premature release of people still needed to transport, transfer, store, or mothball equipment.

Further Hodermarsky stated, "If national foreign policy is not clearly defined, military force planning will become muddled" (1991:67). This is clearly borne out by our research. Since the international balance of power shifted after every war new foreign policies had to be established, and force structure according to policy. Perhaps the only solution to this predicament might be to "freeze" military forces until political leaders can establish new foreign policy goals. However, due to other considerations, such a solution is clearly an impractical one.

Along the same lines, Hodermarsky stated that "Periods of uncertainty in international relationships and military strategy will push the process toward the less controversial 'balanced force,'" (1991:67). This "balanced force" always was the result of interservice rivalries over declining appropriations. Because of disagreements over what constitutes the "most effective" force, the compromise usually was the "most acceptable" force. This force usually represents a scaled down version of the force existing at the end of the war.

Another point Hodermarsky made is that while naval forces should have been planned from the top down, domestic policy and subsequent reduced funding soon became the primary influence on force size and composition (1991:68). Again, we have to agree and say that this statement was generally true for all services and postwar demobilizations. While military planners after every war had some notion of what they wanted their service to look like, this vision was soon reduced by legislation limiting the size of military forces. These legislative limits then were followed by reduced appropriations that made it impossible to reach even these limited levels.

Nonetheless, as the total personnel figures in Appendix A demonstrate, active forces after every major war, except Vietnam, were larger than the peacetime forces before each war began.

Two other of Hodermarsky's lessons we agree with are that "Continued defense spending will be difficult to justify in a postwar period" and "The 'cheap fix' will always be attractive" (1991:68). History demonstrates that these problems were inevitable. As the population and political leaders shifted their attention to new priorities, defense spending was reduced to make room for more pressing budget items. A "cheap" solution often was the increased reliance on reserve forces. While reliance on reserve forces in itself is not problematic, when combined with

inadequate funding and control it caused a dramatic reduction in readiness.

To deal with inadequate performance of the National Guard, leaders and proponents of the active forces succeeded in gaining increased federal control of the Guard. At the same time, leaders of the National Guard were able to establish the Guard as a legitimate reserve component of the military establishment. Nevertheless, increased control without adequate funding did little to improve mission effectiveness.

Another reason for reductions in active military manpower frequently was the inability of the military services to recruit a sufficient number of personnel. Recruiting shortfalls usually occurred during periods of all-volunteer forces when funding for personnel programs such as military pay and benefits were insufficient. These shortfalls later had to be corrected by the implementation of the draft and led to military unpreparedness before most wars. Only between the Korean and Vietnam wars did the draft remain in effect, predominantly because of the Cold War. Another exception was the war in the Persian Gulf where reserve component forces demonstrated that given proper attention and funding the reserve concept can work.

As Hodermarsky stated, "Postwar reductions are inevitable" (1991:69). The task for military leaders and planners thus was to "contain the damage," and to reduce

forces while maintaining a commensurate level of military effectiveness. The attempt to do "more with less" often resulted in a "hollow force" that looked good on paper but was ineffective when tasked. While peacetime units have traditionally been smaller in anticipation of wartime manpower additions, the ability of an organization to assimilate new people was always limited and resulted in the need for extended periods of training.

Today, military planners are again faced with decreasing force levels. Political and military leaders make every effort to reduce and consolidate while maintaining or increasing the effectiveness of the remaining force. But the possibility exists again that, as the memory of war begins to fade and domestic concerns come to the forefront, military funding cuts will be seen as an easy way to deal with immediate problems but may not do much for longterm readiness issues.

V. Force Maintenance

Political Background and Policy

Introduction. Force maintenance is the term we use to describe the military during peacetime. The legislation and policies enacted during force maintenance periods were discussed in detail in the political background and policy section of the previous chapter on mobilization. Therefore the following sections will briefly discuss trends.

Post Spanish-American War. Millet and Maslowski note that after demobilization, the public demanded to know the reasons for the Army's chaotic mobilization and why thousands more men had died from disease in the military camps than had died from combat wounds (1984:284-286).

President McKinley appointed a commission to look into Army administration of the war. The commission found no wrong doing in the Army's conduct, but did recommend that the division of authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General be clearly defined, and that stockpiles of critical military supplies be maintained to keep the nation in a better state of preparation for future mobilizations (Kriedberg and Henry, 1955:173). The authority issue was addressed in the General Staff Act of 1903. Congress authorized the Commanding General to be replaced by a General Staff. However, the issue of stockpiling materials appears to have never been addressed.

The other major issue addressed during this time was the role of the militia and volunteers. Congress felt the militia had not adequately responded to the Spanish-American War. Congress sought to strengthen the militia and also remove restrictions on overseas use through a series of Acts, beginning with the Dick Act in 1903 and culminating with the National Defense Act of 1916. However, when the militia failed to provide sufficient manpower to guard the Mexican border, compulsory service came under discussion (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:200-201), and was implemented when the U.S. entered World War I in 1917 to meet the manpower requirements.

Post World War I. After the end of World War I, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920. The Act acknowledged that historically the United States maintained a standing force too small to meet the needs of a great war. However, while it allowed for an increase in active duty personnel, a primary part of the Act dealt with reaffirming the use of the National Guard and the citizen soldier, and also required the Regular Army to train these units during peacetime (Matloff, 1973:407-408). Additionally, responsibilities for mobilization planning were delineated between the Secretary of War and the General Staff (Kriedberg and Henry, 1955: 380). After the 1920 legislation, Congressional interest in military capabilities declined until 1936 (Matloff, 1973:414). Congress and the

public felt that the United States could avoid future wars; therefore, the military was given minimal funding and equipment modernization was neglected (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:386). Active Congressional interest in the military through legislation does not occur again until 1938, when Congress responded to Japan's renouncement of 1921 naval tonnage ratios with the Naval Act of 1938. By 1940, the prospect of involvement in war was growing and Congress passed another naval expansion act and the nation's first peacetime draft.

Post World War II. In the five years between the end of World War II and the Start of Korea, Congress took steps to correct perceived deficiencies in the mobilization for World War II. Legislation for stockpiling strategic materials was passed, the Department of Defense was established to provide greater unified control over the services, and surplus industrial plants were authorized to be maintained for future mobilizations (Clem, 1983:52-53). Congress was also preparing the United States for the possibility of future conflict with the Soviet Union.

Post Korean War. After the Korean War, the United States military posture switched from being reactive to a more proactive stance by remaining at a high level of readiness to deter future communist adventurism into other nations. Defense of the United States now meant keeping communism from infiltrating over other parts of the world.

Both the services and the military industrial base were maintained at the highest peacetime levels ever known.

Post Vietnam. Many policy and political changes occurred during this period. Initially after Vietnam, the nation and Congress were concerned with insuring that there would be "no more Vietnams ". The Draft was ended, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution to limit the President's unilateral use of force without Congressional approval, and the nation and Congress again deemphasized the military. By 1979, however, interest in military capability was renewed when Iran seized the U.S. embassy in Teheran, and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. President Carter began to rebuild U.S. military capability, and Reagan was elected President partly because of his promise to renew American military strength (Halloran, 1986:18-19).

The military went through a period of modernization, and President Reagan successfully used military power as an instrument of his national policy. By 1985, Congress and the public began to wonder if such increased military spending was healthy for the nation and military funding subsequently slowed down. Then, a further change in conditions caused the United States to question military spending: it appeared that the Soviet Union and the United States could live in peaceful coexistence, especially given the fact that the Soviet Union began to move closer toward a

capitalistic economy. As a result, by 1990, Congress was talking of reduced military forces and peace dividends.

Post Desert Storm. Proper force reduction levels and roles of the U.S. Military are being discussed in Congress. It is too early to make many observations on political and legislative trends at this time.

Military Manpower Procurement

Introduction. This section will describe the manpower procurement efforts and policies employed during relatively stable periods between major military activities. Generally, these are periods of peace; however, after the Second World War we find an increased military state of readiness in anticipation of communist aggression, commonly called the "Cold War".

As Griffith pointed out, initially the citizens of this country, based on earlier colonial experiences, had a strong distrust of standing armies and centralized control. This distrust is expressed in the Second and Third Amendment to the Constitution, written to keep the government from disarming citizens and to restrict quartering of soldiers on private property (1988:14). Therefore, the militia system was chosen, which not only would protect against enemies but also against one's own standing army, should protecting against the standing army ever be required (Millis, 1956:43).

Of necessity, the Revolutionary War saw the creation of a standing army, the Continental Lines (Griffith, 1988:11). Immediately after the war this force was dramatically reduced to a mere 80 troops, inadequate to fight Indians or any other enemies. Subsequently, troop levels were adjusted by Congress based on need; however, since enlistment usually depended on volunteers, and incentives were inadequate, authorized troop strengths were seldom reached.

Following the Civil War, arguments ensued between supporters of a large standing army and supporters of the National Guard (the new name the militias had assumed). For the most part the National Guard supporters won by allowing more federal control over the Guard and by making it the legitimate reserve of what little Regular Army there was (Griffith, 1988:20).

Post Spanish-American War. Between 1902 and 1911 the Regular Army had an average of about 75,000 officers and enlisted men spread out over the Philippines, Alaska, China, Hawaii, at home, and elsewhere. This number was far below the 100,000 that Congress had authorized in 1902.

To compensate for this shortfall, and to correct some of the deficiencies found during the war, Secretary of War Elihu Root had in 1901 presented Congress with a program for reform of the National Guard.

The Dick Act of 1903 separated the militia into two classes, the Organized Militia, or National Guard, and the

Reserve Militia. The legislation also provided federal funds to pattern Guard organization and equipment after the Regular Army, a task that was to be accomplished within five years. Additionally, it required the Guard to be inspected periodically by federal authorities to insure training standardization. The act, however, did not provide for increased federal control in wartime (Matloff, 1969:350-351).

While the Army struggled to modernize and reorganize, the Navy, fueled by its good performance during the war and the support of President Roosevelt, expanded and modernized. Between 1899 and 1912 the Navy went from 36 to 64 major combatant vessels, and from 16,354 to 60,376 people. During the same period the Marine Corps expanded from 3,142 to 10,601 men (Millet and Maslowski, 1984:302).

Post World War I. Griffith relates that "The Army's experience with a draft in World War I convinced it that conscription represented the best solution for future mobilization requirements" (1988:23). Following the war the Army proposed a 500,000 man standing army and a federal reserve, but Congress considered this proposed size too large. The Senate Military Affairs Committee advanced a proposal that would combine "universal military training with the creation of an organized federal reserve," reorganize the National Guard, and provide a formal training role to the Regular Army for both the Reserve and Guard in peacetime (Griffith, 1988:24).

The universal training portion of the bill was defeated, but the National Defense Act of 1920 did provide for more federal control over the National Guard. In addition, the War and Navy Departments received directions to continue with peacetime mobilization planning in case a draft was needed. However, not until the worsening of conditions in Europe years later was public attention brought back to the military forces. Mobilization for World War II commenced with the first peacetime conscription in this country.

Post World War II. During the war General Marshall had begun to consider postwar requirements. Since he believed that the public would oppose a large peacetime force he considered universal military training the most suitable solution. His idea was supported by the Navy and State Department as well as presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Despite these strong advocates, compulsory universal military training was not established:

Most Americans looked forward to a rapid demobilization of the vast war machine and a return to peacetime pursuits. Traditional opponents of compulsion raised again the argument that such training represented a dangerous antidemocratic departure from the cardinal national value of freedom of choice. Furthermore, critics charged, compulsory training risked inculcating youths with militaristic values that would undermine the principle of civilian supremacy. (Griffith, 1988:27)

Large occupation forces for Germany and Japan, and the large standing forces required by the Cold War further

helped shift the focus away from universal training which was supposed to eliminate the need for a large peacetime standing force.

However, in anticipation of universal military training President Truman did not seek renewal of selective service legislation when it expired in March 1947. Subsequently, only the new Air Force reached recruiting goals (Griffith, 1988:27).

Tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, after World War II, increased the potential need for large armed forces and President Truman responded by requesting that Congress enact universal military training as well as resume the draft. Congress did not approve universal military training but revived selective service in 1948. The new law required draftees to serve for 21 months with a maximum reserve obligation of five years. Deferments were provided for men in reserve components (Ebel, 1988:176-177; Griffith, 1988:28).

Opponents of selective service argued that lowering intelligence standards to wartime levels as well as higher pay would sufficiently encourage volunteerism to make the draft unnecessary. Draft supporters, however, pointed out that modern military service required higher intelligence and that American pay rates already were higher than in any other country (Griffith, 1988:28).

The draft stimulated enough voluntary enlistments to make draft calls unnecessary by February 1949, but selective service legislation was renewed in 1950. The Korean War caused legislation to be again renewed in 1951, this time for four years (Griffith, 1988:28-29).

Post Korean Conflict. By now peacetime conscription was an accepted fact and legislation was extended in 1955, 1959, and 1963 (Ebel, 1988:178). The draft allowed the Services to depress enlisted pay and keep military expenditures down. Reliance on strategic nuclear forces made it possible to reduce standing forces, and draft calls fell accordingly thereby making liberal draft deferments possible (Griffith, 1988:29-30).

By 1963, some groups started questioning the equity of a system that called a few but let the majority escape. When President Johnson decided not to call reserve components in favor of increasing the number of draft calls, criticism of Johnson's policies also began to grow (Griffith, 1988:30-31).

Post Vietnam. By 1973 the draft was discontinued and reliance was placed on all-volunteer forces. The Armed Services were restructured to move toward the Total Force Policy, where reserve components would take on more responsibility. For example, by 1991 "more than 80 percent of the Army's total combat units and more than 80 percent of its total service support units are in the Reserve

Components" (Leonard, 1991:9). To attract volunteers enlisted pay was raised and standards were lowered.

The Gates Commission, which when appointed by President Nixon had recommended a volunteer force, had envisioned a volunteer force only in peacetime. It was to be supplemented by a standby Selective Service System to register young men, which could be called quickly in an emergency. But registration was halted, by presidential action, in April 1975 (Griffith, 1988:37; Ebel, 1988:179-181). Ebel stated that the situation changed again when:

In October 1977, the Department of Defense established new, more demanding wartime requirements. Previously, Selective Service had been tasked to deliver the first draftees no sooner than 110 days after the beginning of a mobilization. The new requirement was to deliver the first draftees in 30 days. Subsequently, the Defense Department asked Selective Service to deliver the first inductees in 13 days and 100,000 inductees in the first 30 days. (1988:181)

These requirements could only be met if men were registered before mobilization. In the Defense Authorization Act of 1980, Congress required the President to develop an equitable plan to insure Selective Service could meet DoD's demands. President Carter, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, asked Congress to amend the Military Service Act to provide for the registration of women. Congress would not authorize the registration of women but authorized the revival of Selective Service.

Subsequently, men born in 1960 or later were required to register during dedicated periods, and beginning in 1981,

were required to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. President Reagan, based on the recommendation of the Military Manpower Task Force he appointed, continued Selective Service and it was still firmly established in 1991 (Ebel, 1988:183-185).

Post Desert Storm. Military forces were being reduced because of the end of the Cold War, thus additional information has been provided in the previous chapter on demobilization; however, some force maintenance aspects still apply.

Desert Storm demonstrated the Total Force Policy to be a valid concept and strengthened the resolve to continue in the direction of active and reserve force integration. However, because of the Total Force Policy, a war without including the reserve components would cause serious problems, even more so than during the Vietnam War, for active forces have come to rely on reserve forces for much of their support. This dependency was well demonstrated during the Gulf War.

Conclusion. In this study of manpower procurement efforts and policies during periods of relatively stable manpower levels several trends can be identified. Most of these trends, such as volunteerism, a move toward and away from conscription, and a trend toward more federal control have been identified in earlier chapters. Therefore, the main trend to be identified in this section is the tendency

of the people and the government of this country to avoid large standing forces during peacetime and to put more trust in the reserve components.

Frequently the standing forces became smaller than intended, usually authorizations for a sizeable force were made, but when it came to funding these authorizations, other priorities took precedence. While the armed forces made great efforts to do "more with less", this was always difficult, and as Gandy states, "you get what you pay for!" (1991:65). Often an organizational structure reminiscent of much larger forces was maintained, resulting in a "hollow force" or as Hodermarsky quotes Vincent Davis, an "'undernourished giant rather than a fit midget'" (1990:6).

Training

Introduction. Generally the training of U.S. armed forces during peacetime suffered due to funding cutbacks and inadequate equipment. Requirements for occupation forces first in former Spanish possessions, and later in Germany and the Far East further reduced training levels because these forces often were restricted to guard and garrison duty. Only with the beginning of the Cold War did peacetime training levels increase. Whether recent funding reductions may again have a detrimental impact on training levels remains to be seen.

Post Spanish-American War. Following the war the size of the Regular Army was set by legislation on February 2,

1901 to a maximum of 100,000. Actual strength fell as low as 53,940 in 1907. Average size between 1902 and 1911 was 65,616 (not counting the Hospital Corps and the Philippine Scouts). Nearly one third of the force was overseas, in the Philippines, Alaska, China, Cuba, Hawaii, and elsewhere. The remaining men were spread out in small posts over the continental United States (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:179).

This distribution made training in units larger than regiments impossible. Although the fight against insurgents in the Philippines kept at least some of the men prepared for some time, Kreidberg and Henry reported, "The first line of defense [the Regular Army] was paper-thin" (1955:179).

The second line of defense was to be the Militia. The war had shown some serious weaknesses of the Militia and attempts were made to correct some of these deficiencies through the Dick Act of 1903. However, this act was not successful until amended by the Militia Act of 1908. This act eliminated the restriction to nine months for Federal service, and required that in order to receive federal funds "all state forces must have the same organization, armament, and discipline as the Regular Army" (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955:179-180).

Changes were slow, however, and in a 1910 report to Congress the Army War College lists the Militia as deficient in training, lacking in physical stamina, and woefully under strength. Nevertheless, joint maneuvers of the Regular Army

and the Militia were held as often as possible; in fact, Kreidberg and Henry report that the maneuvers of 1914 were somewhat successful despite the fact that many weaknesses were still apparent (1955:181,186).

While the Army struggled, the nation, as a new colonial power, saw a need to increase its Navy. Because of this perceived need the Navy grew in the 14 years after the war by 44,000 men -- to over 60,000. Due to the gradual buildup and President Roosevelt's support, the Navy encountered few serious training problems. During the same time the Marine Corps grew from just over 3000 men to more than 10,000, many of them serving in the Philippines, China, and other troublespots, thus staying well trained. Also, in the years after the war, the first genuine Marine Officers' School was founded (Matloff, 1969:350-351; Millett and Maslowski, 1984:302; Krukal, 1984:4).

Post World War I. After the First World War arms reduction treaties limited the amount of forces that could be maintained. More limiting, however, were budgetary constraints that made it impossible for the military to modernize or conduct effective training. Spector quoted Weigley about the condition of the Army:

'the Army during the 1920s and early 1930s may have been less ready to function as a fighting force than any time in its history. It lacked even the combat capacity that the Indian campaigns had forced on it during the nineteenth century and the pacification of the Philippines had required early in the twentieth century.' (1988:70)

As Spector pointed out, the 1920s and 1930s were a time of fiscal constraint in government. To keep government spending down the Bureau of the Budget had been created and a unitary budget for the executive branch was implemented. However, the Bureau of the Budget "often operated as simply a bludgeon to beat the financial requests of the executive agencies, such as the Army and Navy" (1988:73).

The National Defense Act of 1920 had allowed for a regular army of 280,000, yet neither the President nor Congress were willing to fund this force. By 1924 the Army was below 125,000 (Spector, 1988:73). The National Defense Act also called for an organized reserve and a National Guard of 450,000 (Kaune, 1990:12). However, the Guard enrollment did not even reach 200,000. The Reserve Officer Training Corps commissioned reserve officers, but few funds were available for them to train with the army. In addition, the Enlisted Reserve Corps never materialized due to lack of money (Spector, 1988:72).

Lack of funds severely curtailed training activities. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower stated in his autobiography:

military appropriations during the thirties had restricted training to a unit basis. Even small arms ammunition for range firing had to be rationed in occasional doles. The Army concentrated on spit and polish, retreat formations, and parades because the American people, in their abhorrence of war, denied themselves a reasonable military posture. (1948:7)

Even tanks could only train for a few hours at a time because fuel was considered too expensive (Spector, 1988:72).

Larger than unit training would have been difficult as well because by 1939 the Army's 170,000 men were spread over 130 locations throughout the continental U.S. and overseas (Kaune, 1990:12). Spector also faulted Army leaders for maintaining the Army's complete 1919 force structure of nine divisions, "although few could be manned to brigade strength" (1988:72), thus making realistic training even more difficult and making even a small combat ready force impossible.

The National Guard was to be trained by the Regular Army; however, as mentioned above, the Army had first to deal with its own training concerns, thus the Guard was left to its own devices. Its drills and encampments were inadequate for modern warfare. Often Guardsmen donated their own time to get what little formal training was available because funds to send men to training were insufficient (Kaune, 1990:13).

The United States traditionally avoided a large standing army, however, the Navy was considered the country's "First Line of Defense" and was usually funded better than the Army. But, even the Navy felt the budget ax after the First World War (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1047).

While treaties limited the size of the Navy, even this reduced strength was not reached because of Congress' refusal to fund sufficient construction. Some modifications to older ships, however, were possible. The onset of the Depression limited the Navy budget even more (Spector, 1988:73). Although Congress authorized 15 cruisers and one aircraft carrier in 1929, only eight cruisers had been completed by 1933. Indeed, it was not until 1939 that a significant building program was established (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1047).

Post World War II. A combination of chaotic demobilization after the war and funding cutbacks left the services in a difficult position. For some time they were able to use leftover war materiel for training, later even war reserves were used, but training with old equipment and materials was of limited benefit.

The Army heavily supported universal military training, where every young man would be required one year of service to the country. While universal military training would have been a source of cheap, abundant manpower, the Navy and Air Force expressed some reservations about the large training requirements created by this system, training that due to the technical nature of the two services would require most or more than the one year considered. Though the Nation and Congress were not willing to implement universal military training, the peacetime draft was

reinstated in 1948. The draft provided for a higher quality force than volunteering would have made possible (at the same pay levels), and encouraged young men to volunteer for the service or assignment of their choice (Griffith, 1988:27-29).

One interesting problem encountered in a study reported by Marshall was that over 75 percent of infantry soldiers would not employ their weapons against the enemy in the Second World War. Subsequently, during 1948-49 the Army instituted new training programs to overcome "weapons inertia." Marshall further reported that due to this training, weapons participation in Korea more than doubled, from the less than 25 percent in World War II to over 55 percent in Korea (Marshall, 1986:338).

While discussions were ongoing on how manpower should be procured, a large part of the Army was assigned to occupy Japan and Germany. The Korean war later revealed, these forces had little adequate equipment and even less training.

Peppers stated that due to the discharge of almost nine million men almost immediately after the war, many of the remaining personnel were of higher rank and had to perform duties they were not trained for. He reports of Army Air Force officers working as aircraft and engine mechanics, often having their work checked by NCOs (1988:151).

The Navy had planned for a postwar force of 500,000 enlisted and 50,000 officers, but by 1949 it had been

reduced to 363,000 enlisted and 46,000 officers. Largely, these cuts had been made across the board and training suffered accordingly. While the Berlin Blockade and the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia resulted in a manning increase in late 1949, by 1950 further cuts were necessary (Hodermarski, 1990:43-45).

Post Korean Conflict. Between Korea and Vietnam training levels were kept somewhat higher because of the Cold War. During the war the Truman administration had embarked on a "crash program" of rearmament to counter any possible Soviet offensive. When General Eisenhower became President he instituted new policies. He slowed the pace of rearmament and emphasized both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Millis states that "the new weapons were to fill the gaps in the front lines to which we were unwilling to assign our manpower" (1956:303). The Korean War had shown that in some circumstances nuclear weapons neither scared the enemy enough nor were usable because of political constraints. However, force levels were still allowed to decline because of trust in the "Nuclear Umbrella" (Griffith, 1988:30).

Post Vietnam. With the end of the war the draft was abolished and the all-volunteer force, replete with reserve components, was integrated into the Total Force. After some initial difficulties the all-volunteer force achieved a high training status, perhaps higher than ever before in

peacetime, largely due not only to strong financial support necessitated by the continuing Cold War, but also because of the possibility of recruiting high quality individuals during economic downturns. Many civilian and military leaders realized that with adequate support reserve components could remain competitive with active forces, and do so at a reduced cost. Readiness of active forces was repeatedly tested in small incidents such as Grenada and Panama, and these flareups actually helped to uncover and correct training problems.

Post Desert Storm. The end of the Cold War, signalled more reductions in military funding. As in earlier periods, these reductions may again impact military training. While it is difficult to make any predictions, some observations can be made. Auster reported of the Army:

Trained soldiers are the Army's only "product." But until 1973, the Army's training program had changed little since World War I. Its staples were live ammunition and cardboard targets. "It was like an assembly line," says retired Gen. Paul Gorman "Soldiers moved through without much attention being paid to whether they learned anything or not."

Today soldiers train the way they would fight, against an "opposition force" that many think is better than any potential enemy in the world. "Training pays dividends," says Ben Crosby, a retired Army lieutenant colonel "But it doesn't pay them in the next quarter."
(1992:32)

The last statement points out why we cannot simply take a good military for granted; training is temporary and cannot be preserved, it has to be ongoing. How fast skills decline

was demonstrated by Wisher in a study of Individual Ready Reservists that had recently left the Army and were called for the Gulf War. The research team found that "Skills assessed by written tests decayed mostly within the first 6 months since separation; weapon qualification skills decayed mostly after 10 months" (1991:vii).

Already by 1991, problems began to emerge. Auster also reported of problems caused by the reduction in the active forces:

Col. Pat Wright of the 5th Infantry (Mechanized) was just days away from taking his brigade to the National Training Center [NTC] at Fort Irwin in California. One of his lieutenants was heading off to the year's major training test with 16 soldiers--seven of whom had never been in the field with him. A unit that should have had a sergeant in each tank gunner's seat had two privates 1st class instead. One commander who should have had 54 infantrymen had 40. "We borrow people," says Capt. Bruce Moody. "If I could steal them I would."

When units finish at the NTC, they must return the soldiers they borrowed, but that undercuts training. (1992:31)

While these problems seem minor compared to earlier peacetime force training, they suggest other problems. For example Auster quoted Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan thusly: "'If dollars get tighter ... I will have to turn to where I get the money quickest. That's in training'" (1992:31). Other problems could be caused by the fact that much of today's military training is also applicable to civilian specialities. Auster reported of a Navy Lieutenant who went through 18 months of training to be able to operate

nuclear propulsion systems on submarines but now sees his future in civilian waste-management and already has an offer from a robotics company. The report also tell about an Army Major who, with two Army-paid master's degrees, sees his future with the FBI (1992:31,32). Other services have similar problems, Bricker reported that at least three Air Force officers enrolled in PhD programs paid for by the Air Force with the intent that they would teach at the Air Force Institute of Technology, applied to separate (1992). These cases indicate that while the services try to first separate their less able performers, voluntary release programs may not only give weaker performers a chance to depart but frequently also reduce the number of better trained individuals in the services, especially if such training applies to civilian jobs.

Conclusion. Military readiness has repeatedly suffered because of reduced defense funding during peacetime; only after the Second World War did the Cold War mandate a higher level of readiness. Often civilian and military leaders chose to have a somewhat larger but ill prepared force over a high quality small force. At other times occupation requirements kept large segments of the force from adequate battle training. The reserve components usually suffered with the active components and often could only sustain some basic training level through personal sacrifice of individual members. Recent funding cutbacks could again

lead to serious training deficiencies unless civilian and military leaders take positive steps to prevent this.

Chapter Summary

It is inevitable that standing forces are smaller during peace time because threats are less immediate and other issues, such as domestic problems, take priority. No one would expect a country to stay on war footing for extended periods of time, especially not Americans with their traditional distrust of large standing forces. In addition, periods of peace are often periods of fiscal constraint, in part to recover from large wartime expenditures.

The usual postwar sequence of events was for the military establishment to plan for large forces to avoid the errors of the past and to be ready for any enemy, whoever it may be. The political establishment took these plans, looked at the threat, which usually was unclear because no new foreign policy was established yet, and reduced the authorized military strength to some reasonable but still sizable number. Thus a goal for demobilization was set. But as the memory of war faded, so did the support for a strong military. Appropriations seldom were sufficient to reach authorized levels and throughout periods of peace forces declined somewhat. Military leaders, however, often maintained the organizational structure of a much larger force. In part, this structure was justified because in

wartime these forces were "rounded out" by additional manpower. Nonetheless, manning of this structure often became so scarce that on several occasions military effectiveness seriously suffered. This condition is often referred to as the "hollow force," a force that looks good on paper, but has a degraded effectiveness in real life.

Frequently requirements to provide occupational forces further reduced military effectiveness. This was especially true after World War II, when forces in Japan and Germany were considered "political" forces which received little training.

Periods of peacetime also usually saw an increased dependence on reserve forces, since standing forces were small. As the Gulf War showed, reserve forces could be very dependable, but like active forces require sufficient funding to provide for proper equipment and training. And in the past, these funds were often lacking.

Soon after the Second World War, the seeds for the Cold War were planted. The Cold War was a period that, except during Korea and Vietnam, was peaceable but characterized by constant vigilance. This vigilance was frequently concentrated on nuclear forces. Indeed, it was not until some years after Vietnam that increased attention shifted to conventional forces. Desert Storm demonstrated how well-prepared these conventional forces had become.

Since the apparent end of the Cold War, all services are again being reduced. Desert Storm slowed the reduction for a short while, but decreases continued after the war. While downsizing can in no way compare to the rapid demobilizations after World War I and II, it is similar to the slower decreases that have occurred during peacetime. For now, the end result of recent manpower cuts as well as any future cuts is difficult to foresee.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Between 1890 and 1992 the United States was involved in six major military conflicts, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm). All these conflicts required some form of manpower mobilization and were followed by some form of manpower demobilization actions. Some general statements can be made about manpower mobilization, demobilization, and the maintenance of a peacetime force during the century studied, and will be used to answer the first three research questions on trends in mobilizations, demobilizations, and force manitenance.

Mobilization Trends

1. The American public always has seen volunteerism as the ideal manpower system for a democracy, sometimes to the detriment of military effectiveness.

2. Conscription became a necessity during the World Wars, and was introduced at a very deliberate pace. Much of its success depended on its decentralized administration. When the draft was maintained after it was no longer absolutely necessary, it became controversial and was eventually abolished.

3. It was always difficult to synchronize manpower and industrial mobilization, and frequently training was hindered by lack of suitable equipment. Historically,

manpower takes less than one year to raise, while mobilizing the industrial base to produce weapons and equipment takes over two years. Additionally, the military and industry frequently competed for the same manpower pool.

4. Peacetime reliance on cheaply maintained reserve forces made for unpleasant surprises during mobilization.

5. Increased federal control of reserve forces allowed for their better utilization, and their use outside American soil.

6. There is a trend toward increasing cooperation within and among the services caused by Congressional creation of the Department of Defense and continued legislation to ensure centralized control over the Services.

7. The higher the level of training, the better the cooperation among units and services. Higher echelon training has to follow lower echelon and individual training.

8. Mobilization planning became increasingly important but often was disregarded. Only in Desert Storm were pre-war personnel mobilization plans followed.

Demobilization Trends

1. Reducing manpower was always easy, maintaining proportional military effectiveness was not. Rapid personnel reductions often caused turbulence that reduced military effectiveness.

2. Postwar force planning depended on clearly defined foreign policy. However, immediately after a war it was always difficult to predict who the next enemy might be.

3. Reduced military budgets and imperfect knowledge about the future of war caused the services to fight over priorities, often leading to "most acceptable" rather than "most effective" forces.

4. Reduced forces after every war were still larger than prewar forces until Vietnam.

5. A new balance between reserve and active forces was struck after every war. The general trend was to make reserve forces more like the active forces and to put them under increasing federal control.

Force Maintenance Trends

1. Americans traditionally distrusted large standing forces during peacetime and were always unwilling to pay for large forces unless there was a clear threat.

2. Funding cutbacks frequently reduced the military effectiveness of the standing forces.

3. In peacetime increased reliance was placed on reserve forces, often with the mistaken belief that these forces could be maintained on a shoestring budget.

4. Rather than cutting the organizational structure to coincide with the size of the forces, military leaders often retained too many severely undermanned units. These units were difficult to get combat ready when needed.

Future Planning Efforts

In response to research question number four, the following recommendations are advanced:

1. While it is generally easy to assemble a sizable manpower pool, increasing technological advancement will place an ever greater burden on training and equipping these forces. It is likely that in future mobilizations equipment will be the limiting factor. Maintaining some suitable industrial policy will be important. Industrial policy is currently receiving much emphasis in mobilization preparedness literature, yet actual action needs to come from joint effort by Congress and the Department of Defense.

2. The speed of international developments contrasts with the ever greater need for time to train and equip forces. How well plans to train and equip active and reserve forces are maintained may play a predominant role in U.S. ability to actually respond to a crisis.

3. If history is any guide, peacetime will result in reduced funding for the military. While maintaining large organizational structures will be tempting, smaller structures will be more effective.

4. Demobilization should occur at a deliberate pace to avoid unnecessary turbulence in the remaining forces.

5. Replacement, rotation, and demobilization policies should be well thought out. U.S. forces often relied on policies tailored to the individual and were difficult to

reconcile with group efforts required by any military activity.

6. Mobilization should follow established plans as much as practicable to avoid reinventing the wheel.

Recommendations for Further Study

While the manpower and personnel related literature about World War I and II is extensive, less information is available on more recent conflicts. Detailed research on the Korean and Vietnam War is warranted. Information on the Gulf War appears to exist in abundance; however, consolidating of the various sources of information, once the dust settles, might be a worthwhile undertaking.

The conflict between conscript and all-volunteer forces appears to be currently settled in favor of all-volunteer forces as the primary manpower procurement tool; however, history shows often various circumstances cause a switch in manpower systems. More detailed research into the nature of these circumstances is warranted.

One component of manpower decisions in the United States is the question of equity versus efficiency. While it is more equitable to send every eligible citizen to war for a certain amount of time, as it has been imperfectly done in the Korean and Vietnam War, this is clearly not the most efficient method. Men in World War I and II were in the services "for the duration" but had to carry a disproportionate share of the wars' burden.

Social equity is also discussed during and after every war. Frequently some groups are under or over represented in the military services. For example, during the Vietnam War both the rich and the poor were under represented in the military, while the lower socio-economic groups were over represented. Since Vietnam, much research has been done but many questions about fairness, equity, and efficiency remain unanswered.

Another important topic not discussed here is international cooperation. All the wars discussed, with the exception of the Spanish-American War, were fought side-by-side with other countries. We discussed how training for interservice cooperation is the highest level of training. Because international cooperation, with its language and cultural barriers, is even more difficult to train for, it should be thoroughly studied.

Also not included in this study is any kind of comparison of U.S. manpower systems with those of other countries. While we have assumed a subjective standard, comparative studies between nations would shed some light on this issue and perhaps would provide more objectivity.

Appendix A: Graphs of Military Trends.

The following three pages present graphs to support claims made in our thesis. These graphs show general trends on the United States Military Services from 1890 until 1990, and were derived from data taken from U.S. Census Bureau abstracts on military personnel, military pay and U.S. population. Abstract years used were the Historical Statistics, and the 1982, and 1989 Statistical Abstract of the United States. The first graph shows the actual number of active duty military forces during the last century. The second graph shows the annual percentage of the United States population serving on active duty. The third graph shows how enlisted pay increases have been used as incentive during times of war and when the United States transitioned back to an all-volunteer force in 1973.




Figure 1. Active Duty Force Size Over Last 100 Years
 (Historical Abstract, 1975:8, 9, 175, 176, 1140;
 Abstract, 1982:28-30, 359-364; Abstract,
 1989:7, 532, 544).




Figure 2. Percent of U.S. Population on Active Duty
Last 100 Years (Historical Abstract, 1975:8, 9,
175, 176, 1140; Abstract, 1982:28-30, 359-364;
Abstract, 1989:7, 532, 544).




Figure 3. Average Annual Enlisted Pay of Last 100 Years
 (Historical Abstract, 1975:8, 9, 175, 176, 1140;
 Abstrac, 1982:28-30, 359-364; Abstract,
 1989:7, 532, 544).

Appendix B: Historical Chronology

This outline is largely based on The Encyclopedia of Military History (second revised edition) by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, and is provided to give a chronological perspective.

1898, Feb 15. The U.S.S. Maine sinks in Havana Harbor after an explosion.

1898, April 25. American Declaration of War against Spain. The Regular Army is increased from 28,000 to 60,000 men, in addition 200,000 volunteers are assembled. The large influx of people overwhelms training and support capabilities. The U.S. Navy, having gone through some modernization, is prepared. (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:907)

1898, April 27. Commodore George Dewey sails from China to the Philippines.

1898, May 1. Battle of Manila Bay.

1898, June 14. The V Corps leaves Tampa for Cuba. The Corps is 16,888 men strong and consists of three extemporized divisions. It includes most of the available Regular Army troops (15 regiments) and 3 regiments of volunteers. Serious shortages of equipment exist. (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:908)

1898, June 30. The Army, under General Wesley Merritt, arrives in the Philippines (10,000 men, part regulars, part volunteers).

1898, July 1. Battle of San Juan and El Caney.

1898, July 3. Battle of Santiago Bay.

1898, July 17. Santiago capitulates (not knowing that American forces are rapidly disintegrating because of yellow fever, malaria, and dysentery)

1898, August 13. Manila capitulates.

1898, December 10. Treaty of Paris. Spain gives independence to Cuba, cedes Puerto Rico and Guam to the U.S., and sells the Philippines to the U.S. for \$20 million (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:908).

1899-1905. Fight against Philippine insurrection.

1900-1903. Secretary of War, Elihu Root, reforms the Army and brings about the establishment of the Army War College (1900), The Command and General Staff School (1901), and the Army General Staff (1903). (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1011)

1903-1919. Minor military activity in Central America (Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua) and the West Indies (Cuba, Haiti).

1914, June 28. Start of World War I.

1914, August 4. U.S. Neutrality declared at outbreak of World War I.

1916, March 9. Francisco (Pancho) Villa raids U.S. border towns. To guard against further attacks, Regular and National Guard troops are sent to protect the border. This force eventually increases to 158,000 men, most of the country's active military strength. Deficiencies encountered help prepare for the coming war. (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1012)

1916, March 15-February 5. Punitive expedition into Mexico by Brigadier General John J. Pershing with 10,000 troops.

1917, February 3. U.S. severs relations with Germany in protest against unrestricted submarine warfare.

1917, March 13. President Wilson decides to arm all merchant vessels passing through war zones.

1917, April 6. The U.S. declares war against Germany after several American ships are sunk. (War against Austria-Hungary is not declared until December 7)

1917, April. The U.S. begins preparations for war. Major General John J. Pershing is selected to command the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). He plans for a one million man army in France by May, 1918, with up to three million men later. The Navy is ready due to earlier building programs. (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:968)

1917, May 19. The Selective Service Act is passed.

1917, June. 1st Division is sent to France (it is a collection of existing Regular Army units).

1918, May 28. 1st U.S. Division attacks Cantigny. 2nd and 3rd divisions reinforce the French against the German Aisne Offensive.

1918, May 30-June 17. Battles of Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood, the 2nd and 3rd divisions stop German forces and counterattack.

1918, July 15-17. Second Battle of the Marne, the 3rd Division holds against German attack. American troops now arrive at a rate of 300,000 a month.

1918, July 18. Allied Counteroffensive begins.

1818, November 11. Armistice.

1919, May 7-June 28. Treaty of Versailles.

1920, June 4. National Defense Act.

1925-1939. Defense appropriations are dwindling, even the Navy, traditional "First Line of Defense," is neglected (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1985:1047).

1929-1938. Great Depression, military appropriations shrink even more.

1935, April. Neutrality Act, forbids American aid to belligerents.

1937, May 1. War Policy Act, softens the provisions of the Neutrality Act.

1939, January 12. President Roosevelt asks Congress for \$552 million for defense.

1939, September 8. Roosevelt declares a limited national emergency.

1939, November 4. Arms embargo is lifted, cash and carry export of munitions and arms is authorized.

1940, June 3. \$43 million worth of "surplus" arms, munitions, planes released to Great Britain.

1940, September 16. Selective Service Act passed by Congress.

1941, March 11. Lend Lease Act.

1941, September. Selective Service Act renewed, passed by one vote in House of Representatives.

1941, September 16. U.S. warships begin to escort convoys west of Island.

1941, December 7. Attack on Pearl Harbor.

1941, December 8. U.S. declares war on Japan.

1941, December 10. Japanese invasion of Luzon starts.

1941, December 11. Germany and Italy declare war on U.S.

1941, December 15. Congress passes \$10 billion appropriation for defense and Lend Lease aid.

1941, December 19. Legal age bracket for selective service extended to 20 and 44.

1941, December 20. First action again Japan by the "Flying Tigers" in China.

1942, April 9. After courageous resistance American forces on Bataan surrender.

1942, April 18. Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle bombs Japanese cities with 16 B-25s flown from the U.S. carrier Hornet.

1942, May 7-8. Battle of the Coral Sea, first great carrier battle (surface ships did not sight each other).

1942, May 30-31. First 1,000 Plane Raid on the European continent by Bomber Command.

1942, June 4-6. Battle of Midway.

1942, August 7. Amphibious landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal.

1942, November 8. Landing in North Africa under supreme commander Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

1943, January 14-23. Casablanca Conference.

1943, July 9-10. First amphibious attack on Sicily.

1943, September 3. Secret armistice with Italy (to be effective September 8).

1943, September 8. Assault at Salerno, first major attack on Italian mainland (now defended by Germans only).

1943, November 20-24. Amphibious attack on Makin and Tarawa.

1943, November-December. Cairo-Tehran Conference.

1944, June 6. D-Day, beginning of Allied invasion of France. Invasion forces gathered in England numbered 1 million men (two-thirds American), supported by another 1 million logistic and administrative support forces. Supporting naval and air forces were close to another million men.

1944, June 15-July 13. Amphibious attack on Saipan.

1944, June 15. First Strike against Japan (from China).
(4:1183)

1944, August 25. Paris liberated.

1944, October. Allies advance into Germany.

1944, October 20-22. Leyte Landings, beginning of the return to the Philippines.

1945, February 3-March 4. Recapture of Manila.

1945, February 19-March 16. Attack on Iwo Jima.

1945, May 8-9, Midnight. Official end of World War II in the West after German unconditional surrender.

1945, August 6. First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima

1945, August 10. Japan offers to surrender.

1945, September 2. Official Japanese surrender.

1945-1947. Peacemaking breaks down, the Cold War begins.

1946, April 4. Horse cavalry abolished.

1947, March 31. Selective Service Act expires.

1947, July 26. National Security Act of 1947 separates the Air Force from the Army and unifies the three armed services within the National Military Establishment. James Forrestal appointed first Secretary of Defense.

1947, September 26. U.S. Air Force established.

1948, June 19. New Selective Service Act reinstates conscription.

1948, June 22. Soviets block Western Allied access to Berlin.

1949, May 12. Soviets end Berlin blockade.

1950, May 5. Uniform Code of Military Justice enacted.

1950, June 25. North Korean forces cross into South Korea.

1950, June 30. Selective Service Act extended, legislation also gives authority to call National Guard and Organized Reserve for 21 months of active duty. U.S. forces move into Korea.

1950, June 27. President Truman announces that he will send military aid to French forces in Vietnam.

1950, September 15-25. Inchon landing.

1951, April 11. General MacArthur relieved of command of U.N. and U.S. forces.

1951, September 8. Japanese peace treaty with Allies (not including Soviets).

1951, November. Korean peace discussions start in Panmunjon village.

1953, July 27. Korean armistice signed.

1954, July 21. Geneva conference calls for cease-fire and divides Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel. United States declines to sign agreement.

1955, February 12. U.S. advisors begins training South Vietnamese army.

1956, December. Last mules and carrier pigeons deactivated.

1960, May 7. U-2 aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union.

1961, May 5. President Kennedy announces that it may be necessary to send U.S. troops to Vietnam.

1962, February 7. Total of U.S. troops in South Vietnam is up to four thousand.

1962, October 22. Beginning of Cuban missile crisis.

1962, November 2. U.S. quarantine of Cuba lifted, after resolution of missile crisis.

1964, August 2,4. North Vietnamese patrol boats attack the U. S. destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. The U.S. retaliates with an air strike on North Vietnam.

1964, August 7. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gives President Johnson the authority to use armed force in Southeast Asia.

1965, March 8. 3500 marines land at Da Nang, first U.S. combat troops sent to Vietnam.

1968, January 23. North Koreans seize U.S.S. Pueblo.

1968, January 31. Tet Offensive repelled after 26 days of fighting.

1968, May 10. Vietnam peace talks begin in Paris.

1968, October 31. President Johnson halts bombing of North Vietnam.

1969, March 15. President Nixon orders bombing of Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia.

1970, April 29. U.S. troops attack Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.

1970, June 24. Senate repeals Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

1972, October 21. Cease-fire agreement between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

1973, January 27. End of conscription announced.

1973, March 29. All American troops leave South Vietnam, 8,500 U.S. civilian technicians remain.

1973, November 7. Congress limits the authority of the president to commit forces to foreign hostilities.

1975, April 30. Last remaining Americans are evacuated from U.S. Embassy roof in Saigon.

1983, October 23. 241 U.S. Marines killed in suicide attack on peacekeeping forces in Lebanon.

1983, October 25-30. Invasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury).

1986, April 14-15. "El Dorado Canyon" raid on Libya.

1989, December 20. Start of Operation Just Cause in Panama.

1990, August 22. 200K call-up of the Selected Reserve in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August.

1991, January 17. Start of Operation Desert Storm. Since August 450,000 U.S. servicemen and women had been sent to the theater of operation.

1991, February 24. Operation Desert Sabre, the Allied ground campaign, begins.

1991, February 28. End of hostilities against Iraq. Kuwait had been liberated and Iraqi forces defeated.

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Vita

Captain Gottfried Kloimwieder was born on 23 July 1958 in Ybbsitz, Austria. He graduated from high school in Wieselburg, Austria, in 1977. After moving to the U.S. in 1980 he enlisted in the Air Force in 1981. In 1984, while stationed at Scott AFB, Illinois, he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Industrial Technology from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. After his naturalization he was selected for Officer Training School and commissioned in December 1986. His first assignment as an officer was at Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, where he served as Officer in Charge of the Tanker Branch, 379th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, and Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 379th Field Maintenance Squadron. After attending Squadron Officer School he was assigned to the Air Force Institute of Technology in May 1991. Capt Kloimwieder and his lovely wife Jill have four children.

Permanent Address: 890 Lombardy Drive
Fairfield, Ohio 45014

Vita

Captain Noel P. Owen was born on 4 September 1960 in Eureka, California. He graduated from Grant Union High School in Sacramento, California in 1978 and attended the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1982. Upon graduation, he received a regular commission in the United States Army Field Artillery. After taking the Basic Office Field Artillery Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he was stationed in Korea and Hawaii in Artillery units. He married Pamela Armstrong in June 1984. He branch-transferred into the Quartermaster Branch and attended the Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course in Fort Lee, Virginia in 1987. After the Advanced Course he was assigned to Fort Lewis where he commanded the Headquarters Company of the 3/9 Aviation Support Battalion. After finishing 18 months of command in 1989, he was transferred to the Redstone Readiness Group in Huntsville, Alabama to work with Reserve units. His first child, Elaine, was born in 1990 at Huntsville. In March of 1991 he was selected by his personnel branch to attend the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology. His second daughter, Noelle, was born at Wright-Patterson AFB in 1992.

Permanent Address: 640 Claire Ave.
Sacramento, CA 95838

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